7 ms·

In Memoriam: Edmund L. Gettier III

22 points by nkurz 5y ago

nkurz 5y ago
I've often been intrigued by cases where erroneous logic coincidentally leads to a correct conclusion. In philosophy, these are known as "Gettier Problems": https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem They are named after the American philosopher Edmund Gettier, who in 1963 published what is probably the most influential 3 page paper ever written by a philosopher: https://fitelson.org/proseminar/gettier.pdf https://fitelson.org/proseminar/gettier.pdf Searching once again to find the name for this phenomenon, I was surprised to see that Gettier himself was still alive until earlier this year. The submission is a summary of his career by one of his colleagues at UMass.
- fmoralesc 5y ago
  Gettier cases are not cases where erroneous logic leads to a correct conclusion. The reasoning in a Gettier case can be perfectly fine; this is why the belief of Gettierized subjects remains justified. The issue is, rather, that because of "luck" there is a risk for reasoning/belief formation mechanism to go wrong, at the same time that it turns out to have produced a correct/true belief. The issue derives from there being a gap between a proposition being justified and it being true (Linda Zagzebski has a great paper that shows that whenever that is the case, you will end up with an analogous problem).
- bobthechef 5y ago
  Interesting story: Gettier only published his paper on the subject because of pressure to publish. Apparently he wasn’t especially prolific and this led him to publish something, anything, to get people off his back. I recall thinking that the famous paper of his was a little forced. As I understood it, it seemed to conflate the question of whether JTB is a good definition of knowledge — I think it absolutely is — and whether some given proposition is actually known. In the latter case, you would need to know that proposition p is true, that your justification is true, and that you believe it. This becomes a bit more murky IMO, but it doesn’t undermine JTB I would say.
prvc 5y ago
I hypothesize that every philosophical definition is susceptible to a Gettier-type problem.
allturtles 5y ago
I don't get it. I read case I, and I don't see how Jones is 'justified' in believing (e), since his belief is based on a false premise derived from hearsay. But maybe I'm missing some technicality in the meaning of 'justified.' In any case, "justified true belief" seems like a flimsy basis for epistemology, since we have no independent oracle to ask whether our beliefs are true. So this definition doesn't seem to do anything to help us separate knowledge from non-knowledge.
- fdhfdjkfhdkj 5y ago
  Where is Jones in the thought experiment Case I. He attempting to conclude ideas without external influence. There is always external influence
- fmoralesc 5y ago
  One assumption there is that testimony can provide you with justification. We are told by the article that Edmund Gettier has died earlier this year, and we seem to be justified in believing that. In that case, let's assume, justification and truth matches. But this isn't the case always. You may see that the color of the wall is red, for example, and may feel prima facie justified in believing that the wall is red. But it may be the case that, unknown to you, there is a red light projected over the wall, which is actually cream color. In an absolute sense, you are wrong, but your belief is still justified. 'Justified' and 'true' are used for different purposes.
  - allturtles 5y ago
    Okay, I buy that, you can have a justified belief that isn't true, if justification is itself subjective/probabilistic rather than deductive. Then this paper argues that you can have a justified belief that is true, but still isn't knowledge. Why? Because the justification is faulty. Well sure, since we've admitted in the first place that justifications can be faulty. So why would you ever assume that they invariably lead to knowledge? Had the concept of believing right thing for the wrong reasons not been invented in the 1960s? I just can't get myself into a mindset where this is a revelatory finding, but maybe I'm too steeped in a bayesian worldview.

22 points by nkurz 5y ago

I've often been intrigued by cases where erroneous logic coincidentally leads to a correct conclusion. In philosophy, these are known as "Gettier Problems": https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem They are named after the American philosopher Edmund Gettier, who in 1963 published what is probably the most influential 3 page paper ever written by a philosopher: https://fitelson.org/proseminar/gettier.pdf https://fitelson.org/proseminar/gettier.pdf Searching once again to find the name for this phenomenon, I was surprised to see that Gettier himself was still alive until earlier this year. The submission is a summary of his career by one of his colleagues at UMass.

fmoralesc 5y ago
Gettier cases are not cases where erroneous logic leads to a correct conclusion. The reasoning in a Gettier case can be perfectly fine; this is why the belief of Gettierized subjects remains justified. The issue is, rather, that because of "luck" there is a risk for reasoning/belief formation mechanism to go wrong, at the same time that it turns out to have produced a correct/true belief. The issue derives from there being a gap between a proposition being justified and it being true (Linda Zagzebski has a great paper that shows that whenever that is the case, you will end up with an analogous problem).
bobthechef 5y ago
Interesting story: Gettier only published his paper on the subject because of pressure to publish. Apparently he wasn’t especially prolific and this led him to publish something, anything, to get people off his back. I recall thinking that the famous paper of his was a little forced. As I understood it, it seemed to conflate the question of whether JTB is a good definition of knowledge — I think it absolutely is — and whether some given proposition is actually known. In the latter case, you would need to know that proposition p is true, that your justification is true, and that you believe it. This becomes a bit more murky IMO, but it doesn’t undermine JTB I would say.

prvc 5y ago

I hypothesize that every philosophical definition is susceptible to a Gettier-type problem.

allturtles 5y ago

I don't get it. I read case I, and I don't see how Jones is 'justified' in believing (e), since his belief is based on a false premise derived from hearsay. But maybe I'm missing some technicality in the meaning of 'justified.' In any case, "justified true belief" seems like a flimsy basis for epistemology, since we have no independent oracle to ask whether our beliefs are true. So this definition doesn't seem to do anything to help us separate knowledge from non-knowledge.

fdhfdjkfhdkj 5y ago
Where is Jones in the thought experiment Case I. He attempting to conclude ideas without external influence. There is always external influence
fmoralesc 5y ago
One assumption there is that testimony can provide you with justification. We are told by the article that Edmund Gettier has died earlier this year, and we seem to be justified in believing that. In that case, let's assume, justification and truth matches. But this isn't the case always. You may see that the color of the wall is red, for example, and may feel prima facie justified in believing that the wall is red. But it may be the case that, unknown to you, there is a red light projected over the wall, which is actually cream color. In an absolute sense, you are wrong, but your belief is still justified. 'Justified' and 'true' are used for different purposes.
- allturtles 5y ago
  Okay, I buy that, you can have a justified belief that isn't true, if justification is itself subjective/probabilistic rather than deductive. Then this paper argues that you can have a justified belief that is true, but still isn't knowledge. Why? Because the justification is faulty. Well sure, since we've admitted in the first place that justifications can be faulty. So why would you ever assume that they invariably lead to knowledge? Had the concept of believing right thing for the wrong reasons not been invented in the 1960s? I just can't get myself into a mindset where this is a revelatory finding, but maybe I'm too steeped in a bayesian worldview.