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I find the authors arguments about PGP to be really strange because realistically they mostly apply to Signal and other E2EE messaging apps. E2EE only guarante
by giantrobot 5y ago
I find the authors arguments about PGP to be really strange because realistically they mostly apply to Signal and other E2EE messaging apps.
E2EE only guarantees encryption in transit between two end nodes. Infrastructure between those two nodes can't read or alter the payload. That is the only thing it guarantees. Once an end node receives a message any guarantees of encryption/safety go out the window.
There's no guarantee the intended recipient is in possession of the end node or someone isn't shoulder surfing them. There's also no guarantees the end node's local message storage will remain secure in perpetuity.
There's also no guarantee that the metadata of messages, even sent through a nominally secure service, will also remain secure in perpetuity. Signal as a service might be very secure and will never leak metadata but there's no guarantee of that especially if state funded malefactors target the service.
The security of messages at rest is pretty similar between PGP e-mail and Signal messages. Signal's metadata is more secure than e-mail by default but that may not always be true.
- tptacek 5y agoThe point isn't what people can do. No matter what transport you use, people can just screenshot their messages if they want to screw you over. It's what they're likely to do. Nobody that has used encrypted email for any length of time with more than a couple of people has failed to see an unencrypted reply. If they're being honest, most people who've used PGP email for a long time would admit generating unencrypted replies.
- giantrobot 5y agoYou're describing UX issues with e-mail clients and not PGP. If e-mail clients are your problem complain about their failings rather than attributing them to PGP.
- tptacek 5y agoNote the title of the post.
- danShumway 5y agoDoes it matter to the end user? Signal, Matrix, etc... all have functional UIs that users can use today. For whatever reason, either because PGP is too difficult to work with, or just because email clients are too decentralized, or because there's not enough buy-in -- it doesn't actually matter. But for whatever reason, the UX for encrypted emails doesn't work today, and I can't recommend a normal user start using PGP for emails today because of that, and I agree with tptacek that honestly, technical users can't really use it consistently today either. If somebody comes in and solves the UX problem, and suddenly all the issues go away, then that would be different. But I'm not personally holding my breath. It's not really about who's fault it is, it's about telling people not to use a dangerous, error-prone workflow for encrypting their communication. Whether or not PGP itself is good is kind of secondary to that point.