6 ms·
Correct me if I'm wrong, but wouldn't this keep the endpoint accessible for any bot/script that is willing to "invest the work"? E.g. if I only plan to query th
by xg15 5y ago
Correct me if I'm wrong, but wouldn't this keep the endpoint accessible for any bot/script that is willing to "invest the work"? E.g. if I only plan to query the endpoint a few times per day, the captcha won't be an obstacle.
I mean, if that's an intentional exception for personal scripts, that's awesome, but it doesn't really seem to serve the expectations of a CAPTCHA then.
Also, while I like the idea, I fear this could stop working in the long term.
With cryptocurrencies, PoW works because the "good guys" (miners) and the "bad guys" (double spenders) have equal access to computing power: If the difficulty increases, both can simply add more mining hardware and stay in the game. If the "bad guys" threaten to get an advantage, the system can always increase the difficulty without risking to lock out the "good guys".
With CAPTCHA, the situation is different: Here, the "bad guys" (spammers) still have as much computing power available as they can buy and stuff in their data center. However, the "good guys" (regular users) have hard constraint: They have to use whatever hardware the browser runs on (which might just be a smartphone) and they can't spend more than a few minutes to solve the puzzle - otherwise, the user will probably grow impatient and give up.
This means, you can't easily increase the difficulty of the puzzle without locking out regular users. If the captcha grows popular, there can easily be a situation where you'd make the captcha unsolvable for all regular users ling before it would become unsolvable for spammers.
- mrkramer 5y ago>With cryptocurrencies, PoW works because the "good guys" (miners) and the "bad guys" (double spenders) have equal access to computing power: If the difficulty increases, both can simply add more mining hardware and stay in the game. If the "bad guys" threaten to get an advantage, the system can always increase the difficulty without risking to lock out the "good guys". No Bitcoin PoW works because of economics and game theory; it is rational if group of people invested a lot of resources into mining and building consensus that they will stick to that consensus in order to preserve their wealth. Read what Satoshi said in the Incentive section of the Bitcoin Whitepaper: "If a greedy attacker is able to assemble more CPU power than all the honest nodes, he would have to choose between using it to defraud people by stealing back his payments, or using it to generate new coins. He ought to find it more profitable to play by the rules, such rules that favour him with more new coins than everyone else combined, than to undermine the system and the validity of his own wealth."
- ithkuil 5y agoUnless the attacker's whole purpose is to destroy the value of Bitcoin because of some other non-economic reason, e.g. ideological reasons, national security, state self-preservation, ...
- xg15 5y agoThat's a pretty dogma but nothing more. Unfortunately, humans aren't rational in the homo oeconomicus sense. There are all kinds of motivations a person or an organisation could have to manipulate the network that have nothing to do with making money. I mean, even in the regular, non-crypto economy there are lots of products that are sold at a loss for strategic reasons. But you're right, that explanation wasn't quite correct. My point was that cryptocurrencies rely on the assumption that all legitimate users taken together have more computing power than a typical malicious user. That assumption is supported by game theory and made use of with dynamic difficulty adjustment. However for a PoW captcha, the assumption does not hold: The captcha has to be solvable by WASM on a smartphone, otherwise it would lock out legitimate users. And that is a pretty low bar for an attacker to meet, computation-wise.
- oolonthegreat 5y agosurely if you "query the endpoint a few times per day" the captcha indeed shouldn't be an obstacle to that. I thought the idea is to prevent ddos and spam, and not to distinguish between an actual human and bot. like it shouldn't prevent non-harmful scripts like web scraping etc. as long as you don't overtax the servers.
- xg15 5y agoNo, the purpose of captchas has always been to distinguish bot users, no matter what kind of bot. If you don't mind bots but just want to protect against overuse, you can simply set up rate-limiting and be done.
- ncomplex 5y agoI could be wrong, but wouldn't this system "front-load" rather than "back-load" the rate limiting? That is to say: if you rate limit requests globally, it affects all users if one user attempts to spam. On the other hand, this system slows each individual user down without affecting others directly.
- xg15 5y agoGood point. I'm no expert, but I believe rate limiting systems typically use buckets that are partitioned by IP address or network segment or something similar. If there were just a single global bucket, an attacker could exploit the rate-limiter itself to cause a DoS, which is clearly not what the site wants. But yeah, this seems like a way to archive something similar with potentially less complexity. (If you're willing to tolerate the wastefulness, which is still not cool in the age of climate change). A challenge could be correctly invalidating a nonce. You don't want an attacker to reuse a previously solved puzzle for multiple requests - on the other hand, it's difficult to set up a good "time to live" for a nonce as you can't know in advance how much time a user would need to solve this nonce. So I guess some global state to track recently "spent" nonces would be necessary.
- Zababa 5y ago> Correct me if I'm wrong, but wouldn't this keep the endpoint accessible for any bot/script that is willing to "invest the work"? E.g. if I only plan to query the endpoint a few times per day, the captcha won't be an obstacle. Isn't this already the case with other captchas where you can pay people to solve them for you? You could easily build a programmatic solution for that. If you're willing to "invest the work", nothing can really stop people automatically.
- xg15 5y agoIf nothing can really stop people anyway, then what's the point of all this? But I think the problem is that a PoW captcha can be cracked significantly more easily than a regular captcha: For a regular captcha, a spammer would have to deal with brittle image analysis software or find people willing to do extremely boring, borderline illegal work for pennies. For a PoW captcha, they have to load the page in Selenium and... that's it. All that's left is a slight bump in the power bill.
- arbol 5y ago> If nothing can really stop people anyway, then what's the point of all this? Barriers to entry. Different services will require different levels of security. This might be enough for a simple poll app.
- xg15 5y agoBut a barrier for whom? If you're a script kiddy who knows how Selenium works, you can crack this. What this does for resource-poor attackers is implement some wasteful form of rate-limiting. But then, why not just use actual rate-limiting?
- Zababa 5y ago> If nothing can really stop people anyway, then what's the point of all this? It works, the thing is that "working" in that case is to increase the cost of doing this. Solving 1000 captchas costs $2 https://anti-captcha.com/ https://anti-captcha.com/. The difference here is that people that have no money can automate selenium on their own computer and defeat a PoW captcha. But for people that have to pay for either servers or a captcha solving service, there is no difference.