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The option to use a private encryption key is presumably useful, though their still storing logs unencrypted on the users device. The password option is not re
by Retric 5y ago
The option to use a private encryption key is presumably useful, though their still storing logs unencrypted on the users device.
The password option is not really what I would call end-to-end encrypted. This is only as secure as a dictionary attack on users passwords so in practice it looks to be trivially crackable should the FBI etc get a copy of the users “encrypted” data in the key vault + their logs from the cloud storage provider.
https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/163.pdf https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/163.pdf
- baby 5y agoYou only get a few tries, there’s no bruteforce
- Retric 5y agoThere is no way that’s true on a compromised server. The backups need to be recoverable just from the server and a new phone. Your adversaries can just directly copy all data. Picture this: Copy my backup of the server to a new VM, run that, try N passwords, repeat step 1. Of course they can also just modify the software running on the VM.
- baby 5y agoDid you read the whitepaper? The key used to encrypt the backup is not derived from a password