4 ms·
Not every picture of a pipe is a pipe but it's at least conceivable that an actual working pipe can be constructed out of something which happens to be a pictur
by zuminator 5y ago
Not every picture of a pipe is a pipe but it's at least conceivable that an actual working pipe can be constructed out of something which happens to be a picture of a pipe. Similarly Godel isn't proving that all statements in a system are paradoxically self-referential. Only that given any system of sufficient complexity, one can conceivably be constructed.
In any event, all of our mathematical proofs are predicated upon the idea that the representation of a mathematical object can be treated in terms of proof as equivalent to the mathematical object. Is "2" the number 2 or is it just a glyph that non-representationally depicts the successor of the first counting number? And if you believe the latter, then how do you go about proving anything about the actual successor of the first counting number without resorting to glyphs?
- galaxyLogic 5y ago> given any system of sufficient complexity, That's my question. It seems that adding "self reference" to the system makes it more complicated than it would be otherwise. So it's not just a system with enough complexity to let you do arithmetic. You need a system with enough complexity to also do self-reference. And I would say and think that self-reference is complicated. Do we need self-reference in any other areas of mathematics, than Godel's and related proofs?