4 ms·
> it does not explain the qualia of consciousness, or why we are not p-zombies. This is a very hard problem to chip away at from a scientific perspective. Why
by skohan 5y ago
> it does not explain the qualia of consciousness, or why we are not p-zombies. This is a very hard problem to chip away at from a scientific perspective.
Why do you think so? What makes you think subjective experience is not just another type of brain function, like smell, taste or value judgement?
> Do you believe that if we were capable if making a replica of a brain that performed all the same functions in silicon, and had the same computational capacity that it would be conscious? Why or why not?
Yes I do believe so. I believe that consciousness is a function of our nervous system, so if you could make a perfect copy, put it into the same state, and gave it all the same inputs and outputs, it would be conscious.
However I think we're very far from that. the functions of the brain depend on complex and diverse sub-cellular processes which current models don't scratch the surface of replicating with any kind of fidelity, so I think it will be quite some time before we can test this hypothesis.
To pose a similar question to you, if you don't think a perfect replica of the brain would give rise to consciousness, what do you think would be missing?
- goatlover 5y ago> Why do you think so? What makes you think subjective experience is not just another type of brain function, like smell, taste or value judgement? The key here being "not just". The reason is because there is no conceptual identity between subjective states and brain functions. They're entirely different things. This doesn't mean brain states aren't involved. It means a reduction or identity can't be stated as the solution without explaining how the subjective comes from it. This is basically the modern version of John Locke's secondary qualities of perception (color, taste, etc) not being the primary qualities of objects (number, extension, etc). Neurons have objective qualities identified in science. But how they have secondary qualities is the big mystery.