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https://svn-archive.torproject.org/svn/projects/design-paper/tor-design.pdf https://svn-archive.torproject.org/svn/projects/design-paper...

• Thorrez 5y ago
  >A global passive adversary is the most commonly assumed threat when analyzing theoretical anonymity designs. But like all practical low-latency systems, Tor does not protect against such a strong adversary. Instead, we assume an adversary who can observe some fraction of network traffic; who can generate, modify, delete, or delay traffic; who can operate onion routers of his own; and who can compromise some fraction of the onion routers.
  • dragonelite 5y ago
    Sounds like a 51% attack on crypto blockchains.
    • Thorrez 5y ago
      Yes, but this doesn't require 51%, at least as users typically use Tor.