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So you are correct that it can probably never be proven that empiricism is really enough to explain reality, but in my opinion it's a very good place to start.

by skohan 5y ago

So you are correct that it can probably never be proven that empiricism is really enough to explain reality, but in my opinion it's a very good place to start. Science has a very successful track record of claiming explanations from the clutches of mysticism, and our understanding of the world has basically never moved in the other direction. But I don't even think you have to resort to that level of "faith" in physical reality to be fairly confident that the brain is sufficient to explain the mind: 1. The human mind is always co-located with a reasonably well-functioning brain, and has never existed anywhere else. 2. Disrupting the physical/chemical function of the brain dependably and predictably disrupts the function of the mind. 3. We can even sub-locate component functions of what we would consider the mind to sub-regions or processes of the brain. 4. The structure and function of the brain seems to be sufficiently complex to give rise to such a complex phenomenon. If we saw that fact pattern in any other domain, we wouldn't feel the need to look farther for alternate explanations.

zozbot234 5y ago
We also have never seen evidence for elementary particles outside of humongous particle accelerators, so the former must clearly be a mere artifact of the latter. Physicists are no strangers to the "clutches of mysticism" when it comes to issues of foundational ontology!
- skohan 5y ago
  That's a severely strained comparison. We have only seen elementary particles at CERN etc. because we designed those systems to create the extreme situations which we predicted should be able to make elementary particles measurable, based on mathematics derived from empirical evidence. The fact that observable reality lines up so well with predictions in that case is a huge credit to empiricism, and a physical explanation for the universe. If we had a CERN for the science of mind, it would be building an artificial brain and using it to replicate consciousness.
dasil003 5y ago
Well now you're using dog whistles like "mysticism" when I'm talking about philosophy. Regardless of the explanatory power of science, there are always questions that go beyond its sphere. The key question here is "what gives rise to the experience of consciousness?". Everything you described is about the mechanics of cognition, but it does not explain the qualia of consciousness, or why we are not p-zombies. This is a very hard problem to chip away at from a scientific perspective. Do you believe that if we were capable if making a replica of a brain that performed all the same functions in silicon, and had the same computational capacity that it would be conscious? Why or why not?
- skohan 5y ago
  > it does not explain the qualia of consciousness, or why we are not p-zombies. This is a very hard problem to chip away at from a scientific perspective. Why do you think so? What makes you think subjective experience is not just another type of brain function, like smell, taste or value judgement? > Do you believe that if we were capable if making a replica of a brain that performed all the same functions in silicon, and had the same computational capacity that it would be conscious? Why or why not? Yes I do believe so. I believe that consciousness is a function of our nervous system, so if you could make a perfect copy, put it into the same state, and gave it all the same inputs and outputs, it would be conscious. However I think we're very far from that. the functions of the brain depend on complex and diverse sub-cellular processes which current models don't scratch the surface of replicating with any kind of fidelity, so I think it will be quite some time before we can test this hypothesis. To pose a similar question to you, if you don't think a perfect replica of the brain would give rise to consciousness, what do you think would be missing?
  - goatlover 5y ago
    > Why do you think so? What makes you think subjective experience is not just another type of brain function, like smell, taste or value judgement? The key here being "not just". The reason is because there is no conceptual identity between subjective states and brain functions. They're entirely different things. This doesn't mean brain states aren't involved. It means a reduction or identity can't be stated as the solution without explaining how the subjective comes from it. This is basically the modern version of John Locke's secondary qualities of perception (color, taste, etc) not being the primary qualities of objects (number, extension, etc). Neurons have objective qualities identified in science. But how they have secondary qualities is the big mystery.

by skohan 5y ago

zozbot234 5y ago

We also have never seen evidence for elementary particles outside of humongous particle accelerators, so the former must clearly be a mere artifact of the latter. Physicists are no strangers to the "clutches of mysticism" when it comes to issues of foundational ontology!

skohan 5y ago
That's a severely strained comparison. We have only seen elementary particles at CERN etc. because we designed those systems to create the extreme situations which we predicted should be able to make elementary particles measurable, based on mathematics derived from empirical evidence. The fact that observable reality lines up so well with predictions in that case is a huge credit to empiricism, and a physical explanation for the universe. If we had a CERN for the science of mind, it would be building an artificial brain and using it to replicate consciousness.

dasil003 5y ago

Well now you're using dog whistles like "mysticism" when I'm talking about philosophy. Regardless of the explanatory power of science, there are always questions that go beyond its sphere. The key question here is "what gives rise to the experience of consciousness?". Everything you described is about the mechanics of cognition, but it does not explain the qualia of consciousness, or why we are not p-zombies. This is a very hard problem to chip away at from a scientific perspective. Do you believe that if we were capable if making a replica of a brain that performed all the same functions in silicon, and had the same computational capacity that it would be conscious? Why or why not?

skohan 5y ago
> it does not explain the qualia of consciousness, or why we are not p-zombies. This is a very hard problem to chip away at from a scientific perspective. Why do you think so? What makes you think subjective experience is not just another type of brain function, like smell, taste or value judgement? > Do you believe that if we were capable if making a replica of a brain that performed all the same functions in silicon, and had the same computational capacity that it would be conscious? Why or why not? Yes I do believe so. I believe that consciousness is a function of our nervous system, so if you could make a perfect copy, put it into the same state, and gave it all the same inputs and outputs, it would be conscious. However I think we're very far from that. the functions of the brain depend on complex and diverse sub-cellular processes which current models don't scratch the surface of replicating with any kind of fidelity, so I think it will be quite some time before we can test this hypothesis. To pose a similar question to you, if you don't think a perfect replica of the brain would give rise to consciousness, what do you think would be missing?
- goatlover 5y ago
  > Why do you think so? What makes you think subjective experience is not just another type of brain function, like smell, taste or value judgement? The key here being "not just". The reason is because there is no conceptual identity between subjective states and brain functions. They're entirely different things. This doesn't mean brain states aren't involved. It means a reduction or identity can't be stated as the solution without explaining how the subjective comes from it. This is basically the modern version of John Locke's secondary qualities of perception (color, taste, etc) not being the primary qualities of objects (number, extension, etc). Neurons have objective qualities identified in science. But how they have secondary qualities is the big mystery.