4 ms·

I honestly don't understand the need some people seem to have to reach for an extra-physical domain for the mind to exist in. It seems to me quite obvious that

by skohan 5y ago

I honestly don't understand the need some people seem to have to reach for an extra-physical domain for the mind to exist in. It seems to me quite obvious that the human nervous system is necessary and sufficient to create subjective experience in humans. We don't have such doubts about any other organ. For instance if someone's pancreas is damaged or needs to be removed, we accept readily that this person will no longer be able to produce insulin by themselves anymore. We don't search for some alternate metaphysical explanation for blood sugar regulation. It's similarly easy to observe A/B tests vis a vis the brain's role in consciousness.

dasil003 5y ago
I concur that it is unjustified to believe an extra-physical domain is necessary for the mind to exist. However where I differ is your believe that it is "obviously" not necessary. There is a reason this is a philosophical question, and not purely a matter of science. The reason consciousness is special is because we viscerally experience it in a way that is undeniably more significant than any discrete physical observation (such as your example of insulin production). Of course that doesn't prove anything one way or the other, but to unilaterally declare that consciousness is purely a result of mechanical and chemical biological processes is quite a leap and not something that is easily falsifiable. For empiricists and other logically-minded folks the idea that reality begins and ends with the physical world can be comforting—after all, that would mean that everything could likely eventually be explained through physical observation and continued rigorous application of the scientific method. However this line of thinking also relies on faith just as religion does: the faith that our perception of reality is representative of the whole of reality and that there is no facet beyond the reach of a cleverly designed experiment. I am of the opinion that it is hubris to declare one way or another. It's easily conceivable to me that the reality we see and experience is but a reflection of a deeper reality which our meat-sack senses and ideas can not penetrate, but that nevertheless exists and interacts with us.
- zozbot234 5y ago
  The definition of "physical world" is simply a network of cause-effect relations. Since conciousness enters into cause-effect relations with stuff we all acknowledge as "physical" (such as machinery, and indeed our own biology) this shows that whatever we subjectively experience as "conciousness" is itself physical. The fact that we don't know how that physics works under the hood (it's probably nothing close to ordinary mechanics and chemistry!) doesn't mean it's not part of the physical world. It's not "deeper" than physics, it's just more physics.
  - dasil003 5y ago
    I agree. That's why words like "supernatural" or "extra-physical" are misleading, as those are just semantic labels relative to the nature of our current understanding. However that definition is tautological and is distinct from the idea that consciousness arises from neurons firing, which is what most physicalists are taking as the cause of consciousness.
    - skohan 5y ago
      If it's not arising from neurons firing, what is it arising from?
- skohan 5y ago
  So you are correct that it can probably never be proven that empiricism is really enough to explain reality, but in my opinion it's a very good place to start. Science has a very successful track record of claiming explanations from the clutches of mysticism, and our understanding of the world has basically never moved in the other direction. But I don't even think you have to resort to that level of "faith" in physical reality to be fairly confident that the brain is sufficient to explain the mind: 1. The human mind is always co-located with a reasonably well-functioning brain, and has never existed anywhere else. 2. Disrupting the physical/chemical function of the brain dependably and predictably disrupts the function of the mind. 3. We can even sub-locate component functions of what we would consider the mind to sub-regions or processes of the brain. 4. The structure and function of the brain seems to be sufficiently complex to give rise to such a complex phenomenon. If we saw that fact pattern in any other domain, we wouldn't feel the need to look farther for alternate explanations.
  - zozbot234 5y ago
    We also have never seen evidence for elementary particles outside of humongous particle accelerators, so the former must clearly be a mere artifact of the latter. Physicists are no strangers to the "clutches of mysticism" when it comes to issues of foundational ontology!
    - skohan 5y ago
      That's a severely strained comparison. We have only seen elementary particles at CERN etc. because we designed those systems to create the extreme situations which we predicted should be able to make elementary particles measurable, based on mathematics derived from empirical evidence. The fact that observable reality lines up so well with predictions in that case is a huge credit to empiricism, and a physical explanation for the universe. If we had a CERN for the science of mind, it would be building an artificial brain and using it to replicate consciousness.
  - dasil003 5y ago
    Well now you're using dog whistles like "mysticism" when I'm talking about philosophy. Regardless of the explanatory power of science, there are always questions that go beyond its sphere. The key question here is "what gives rise to the experience of consciousness?". Everything you described is about the mechanics of cognition, but it does not explain the qualia of consciousness, or why we are not p-zombies. This is a very hard problem to chip away at from a scientific perspective. Do you believe that if we were capable if making a replica of a brain that performed all the same functions in silicon, and had the same computational capacity that it would be conscious? Why or why not?
GeorgeKangas 5y ago
> ...the need some people seem to have to reach for an extra-physical domain for the mind to exist in. It's because subjective experience (SE) cannot even be defined in physical terms. Or any terms, really. Instead of any definition of SE, all that's on offer are ostensions that will direct a reader's attention to his own SE if he's having it. Such as: Descartes: SE is what you're absolutely certain must exist, even if everything else is an illusion. Nagel: SE is "what it's like to be _____". Nagel again (same paper, but not quoted enough): It [SE] is not captured by any of the familiar, recently devised reductive analyses of the mental, for all of them are logically compatible with its absence. [italics mine]
- skohan 5y ago
  > It's because subjective experience (SE) cannot even be defined in physical terms. Or any terms, really. What makes you think that it's undefinable, rather than that we're just not capable of defining it? For instance, as human beings we cannot ever really understand systems like the weather, or the economy. We can understand some of the component forces involved, but there are too many things interacting for us really to wrap our minds around how the whole thing moves. Similarly, we now have a proof for the 4 color problem, but it had to be provided by a computer, because the number of cases involved in the proof was not really within the grasp of the human mind. As humans, we can basically hold 7-10 things in our mind at one time. So in order to "solve" something, we need to be able to break it down into a maximum of 7-10 component parts at any one time. What if it's the case that the physical origin of subjective experience is perfectly obvious, but it would require a consciousness with the capacity to consider 1000 independent neural processes at the same time to see the solution? > It [SE] is not captured by any of the familiar, recently devised reductive analyses of the mental, for all of them are logically compatible with its absence. I don't really get this one. How is it that the empirical explanation of subjective experience is compatible with its absence?
  - GeorgeKangas 5y ago
    Thanks for replying, skohan! Since this item has moved far off the front page, I'm guessing that just about nobody else will be seeing whatever else we write here. If you wish, you can email me at gwkangas@ku.edu . Descartes described the clearest identifying property of SE: it's absolutely certain to exist. Since absolute certainty lies outside the scope of science: science can't define what SE is, it can only describe what SE does. Science doesn't rule out the philosophical hypothesis known as "illusionism" (advocated by Keith Frankish), that SE is a delusion. If you, skohan, have SE and have correctly identified it: its nonexistence will be inconceivable to you. Are you there yet?

by skohan 5y ago

dasil003 5y ago

I concur that it is unjustified to believe an extra-physical domain is necessary for the mind to exist. However where I differ is your believe that it is "obviously" not necessary. There is a reason this is a philosophical question, and not purely a matter of science. The reason consciousness is special is because we viscerally experience it in a way that is undeniably more significant than any discrete physical observation (such as your example of insulin production). Of course that doesn't prove anything one way or the other, but to unilaterally declare that consciousness is purely a result of mechanical and chemical biological processes is quite a leap and not something that is easily falsifiable. For empiricists and other logically-minded folks the idea that reality begins and ends with the physical world can be comforting—after all, that would mean that everything could likely eventually be explained through physical observation and continued rigorous application of the scientific method. However this line of thinking also relies on faith just as religion does: the faith that our perception of reality is representative of the whole of reality and that there is no facet beyond the reach of a cleverly designed experiment. I am of the opinion that it is hubris to declare one way or another. It's easily conceivable to me that the reality we see and experience is but a reflection of a deeper reality which our meat-sack senses and ideas can not penetrate, but that nevertheless exists and interacts with us.

zozbot234 5y ago
The definition of "physical world" is simply a network of cause-effect relations. Since conciousness enters into cause-effect relations with stuff we all acknowledge as "physical" (such as machinery, and indeed our own biology) this shows that whatever we subjectively experience as "conciousness" is itself physical. The fact that we don't know how that physics works under the hood (it's probably nothing close to ordinary mechanics and chemistry!) doesn't mean it's not part of the physical world. It's not "deeper" than physics, it's just more physics.
- dasil003 5y ago
  I agree. That's why words like "supernatural" or "extra-physical" are misleading, as those are just semantic labels relative to the nature of our current understanding. However that definition is tautological and is distinct from the idea that consciousness arises from neurons firing, which is what most physicalists are taking as the cause of consciousness.
  - skohan 5y ago
    If it's not arising from neurons firing, what is it arising from?
skohan 5y ago
So you are correct that it can probably never be proven that empiricism is really enough to explain reality, but in my opinion it's a very good place to start. Science has a very successful track record of claiming explanations from the clutches of mysticism, and our understanding of the world has basically never moved in the other direction. But I don't even think you have to resort to that level of "faith" in physical reality to be fairly confident that the brain is sufficient to explain the mind: 1. The human mind is always co-located with a reasonably well-functioning brain, and has never existed anywhere else. 2. Disrupting the physical/chemical function of the brain dependably and predictably disrupts the function of the mind. 3. We can even sub-locate component functions of what we would consider the mind to sub-regions or processes of the brain. 4. The structure and function of the brain seems to be sufficiently complex to give rise to such a complex phenomenon. If we saw that fact pattern in any other domain, we wouldn't feel the need to look farther for alternate explanations.
- zozbot234 5y ago
  We also have never seen evidence for elementary particles outside of humongous particle accelerators, so the former must clearly be a mere artifact of the latter. Physicists are no strangers to the "clutches of mysticism" when it comes to issues of foundational ontology!
  - skohan 5y ago
    That's a severely strained comparison. We have only seen elementary particles at CERN etc. because we designed those systems to create the extreme situations which we predicted should be able to make elementary particles measurable, based on mathematics derived from empirical evidence. The fact that observable reality lines up so well with predictions in that case is a huge credit to empiricism, and a physical explanation for the universe. If we had a CERN for the science of mind, it would be building an artificial brain and using it to replicate consciousness.
- dasil003 5y ago
  Well now you're using dog whistles like "mysticism" when I'm talking about philosophy. Regardless of the explanatory power of science, there are always questions that go beyond its sphere. The key question here is "what gives rise to the experience of consciousness?". Everything you described is about the mechanics of cognition, but it does not explain the qualia of consciousness, or why we are not p-zombies. This is a very hard problem to chip away at from a scientific perspective. Do you believe that if we were capable if making a replica of a brain that performed all the same functions in silicon, and had the same computational capacity that it would be conscious? Why or why not?

GeorgeKangas 5y ago

> ...the need some people seem to have to reach for an extra-physical domain for the mind to exist in. It's because subjective experience (SE) cannot even be defined in physical terms. Or any terms, really. Instead of any definition of SE, all that's on offer are ostensions that will direct a reader's attention to his own SE if he's having it. Such as: Descartes: SE is what you're absolutely certain must exist, even if everything else is an illusion. Nagel: SE is "what it's like to be _____". Nagel again (same paper, but not quoted enough): It [SE] is not captured by any of the familiar, recently devised reductive analyses of the mental, for all of them are logically compatible with its absence. [italics mine]

skohan 5y ago
> It's because subjective experience (SE) cannot even be defined in physical terms. Or any terms, really. What makes you think that it's undefinable, rather than that we're just not capable of defining it? For instance, as human beings we cannot ever really understand systems like the weather, or the economy. We can understand some of the component forces involved, but there are too many things interacting for us really to wrap our minds around how the whole thing moves. Similarly, we now have a proof for the 4 color problem, but it had to be provided by a computer, because the number of cases involved in the proof was not really within the grasp of the human mind. As humans, we can basically hold 7-10 things in our mind at one time. So in order to "solve" something, we need to be able to break it down into a maximum of 7-10 component parts at any one time. What if it's the case that the physical origin of subjective experience is perfectly obvious, but it would require a consciousness with the capacity to consider 1000 independent neural processes at the same time to see the solution? > It [SE] is not captured by any of the familiar, recently devised reductive analyses of the mental, for all of them are logically compatible with its absence. I don't really get this one. How is it that the empirical explanation of subjective experience is compatible with its absence?
- GeorgeKangas 5y ago
  Thanks for replying, skohan! Since this item has moved far off the front page, I'm guessing that just about nobody else will be seeing whatever else we write here. If you wish, you can email me at gwkangas@ku.edu . Descartes described the clearest identifying property of SE: it's absolutely certain to exist. Since absolute certainty lies outside the scope of science: science can't define what SE is, it can only describe what SE does. Science doesn't rule out the philosophical hypothesis known as "illusionism" (advocated by Keith Frankish), that SE is a delusion. If you, skohan, have SE and have correctly identified it: its nonexistence will be inconceivable to you. Are you there yet?