4 ms·

We are playing with a slippery slope! A backdoor is a backdoor. Honestly it is getting to the point where open source is the only way to go - imo. I'd like to

We are playing with a slippery slope! A backdoor is a backdoor. Honestly it is getting to the point where open source is the only way to go - imo. I'd like to be able to perform SAST scans and code review on all software that protects my enclaves.

vmception 5y ago
Maybe I’m just jaded but isnt this the bottom of the slippery slope? The backdoored algorithm from a state actor was the slippery slope. Starting to think “slippery slope” worries are unfalsifiable, because there is no standard for admitting that the precedent already occurred and the worst scenario already happened. Oh yeah, and unfalsifiable things are illegitimate to me
- collsni 5y ago
  Lol. Yes you are right. I was directly referencing the idea of purposful backdoors becoming the norm.
jart 5y ago
Most open source crypto code just does what NIST and DJB say to do. There's no magic imparted by it being FOSS.
- collsni 5y ago
  I agree and that's pretty sad. FOSS gives the opportunity to code review.
  - SV_BubbleTime 5y ago
    Heart bleed is still the biggest point against your argument. The key word you correctly used is OPPORTUNITY. I like smaller localized governance, but would not be opposed at all to a federal subsidized program for security bugs and open source development of algorithms and code for commonly required tasks.
- goodpoint 5y ago
  On the contrary, there's plenty of different implementations of the same algorithms. Plus it's also extremely difficult to make underhanded changes to magic numbers if the source code is public.
- slim 5y ago
  NIST or DJB. It's safer to ignore NIST and do what DJB says.
  - nullc 5y ago
    Makes NIST's responses towards DJB in the PQ crypto process have been ... interesting. https://groups.google.com/a/list.nist.gov/g/pqc-forum/c/3mVeyEfYnUY/m/_xYg6HRcDQAJ https://groups.google.com/a/list.nist.gov/g/pqc-forum/c/3mVe...
    - slim 5y ago
      It's even more interesting that DJB did not care to answer
      - nullc 5y ago
        He had answered, in advance-- in the form of a formal complaint because the substance of NIST's message (the complaint that DJB had hung a carrot of 'attacks' in front of them in private but hadn't delivered a publication 'on time') had been previously stated by one of their staff. He published the formal complaint today: https://groups.google.com/a/list.nist.gov/g/pqc-forum/c/4baO2sC9dLA/m/PRlPLUL1BgAJ https://groups.google.com/a/list.nist.gov/g/pqc-forum/c/4baO...
  - jart 5y ago
    Well that's what most open source does today. GitHub posted a blog post four days ago that the majority of SSH clients have moved away from aes to chacha. https://github.blog/2021-09-01-improving-git-protocol-security-github/ https://github.blog/2021-09-01-improving-git-protocol-securi... I wouldn't be surprised if the majority of https traffic uses x25519 these days instead of rsa or ℘256. djb is an influential guy.
- cryptonector 5y ago
  And you still need to review the code yourself and review the compiler's code, and all the object code produced, and test it, and...
nonameiguess 5y ago
This was known to be compromised, though. People using it anyway weren't being fooled because they couldn't audit the code. They were forced by federal standards or they'd lose the ability to sell to the government and go out of business. Your best bet is multiple layers of defense. It may sound ridiculous, but don't use just one VPN/firewall. Make your adversaries compromise multiple vendors. Encrypt several times. That's what the actual DoD does and why the NSA probably doesn't even care. And, of course, the really important information is classified and never hits a publicly reachable network at all, so compromising the supply chain doesn't even help. As a private organization, you probably don't have the option to build an entirely separate network that doesn't touch the Internet and then protect the ingress/egress nodes with your own private military, so I don't know what to tell you there.

vmception 5y ago

Maybe I’m just jaded but isnt this the bottom of the slippery slope? The backdoored algorithm from a state actor was the slippery slope. Starting to think “slippery slope” worries are unfalsifiable, because there is no standard for admitting that the precedent already occurred and the worst scenario already happened. Oh yeah, and unfalsifiable things are illegitimate to me

collsni 5y ago
Lol. Yes you are right. I was directly referencing the idea of purposful backdoors becoming the norm.

jart 5y ago

Most open source crypto code just does what NIST and DJB say to do. There's no magic imparted by it being FOSS.

collsni 5y ago
I agree and that's pretty sad. FOSS gives the opportunity to code review.
- SV_BubbleTime 5y ago
  Heart bleed is still the biggest point against your argument. The key word you correctly used is OPPORTUNITY. I like smaller localized governance, but would not be opposed at all to a federal subsidized program for security bugs and open source development of algorithms and code for commonly required tasks.
goodpoint 5y ago
On the contrary, there's plenty of different implementations of the same algorithms. Plus it's also extremely difficult to make underhanded changes to magic numbers if the source code is public.
slim 5y ago
NIST or DJB. It's safer to ignore NIST and do what DJB says.
- nullc 5y ago
  Makes NIST's responses towards DJB in the PQ crypto process have been ... interesting. https://groups.google.com/a/list.nist.gov/g/pqc-forum/c/3mVeyEfYnUY/m/_xYg6HRcDQAJ https://groups.google.com/a/list.nist.gov/g/pqc-forum/c/3mVe...
  - slim 5y ago
    It's even more interesting that DJB did not care to answer
    - nullc 5y ago
      He had answered, in advance-- in the form of a formal complaint because the substance of NIST's message (the complaint that DJB had hung a carrot of 'attacks' in front of them in private but hadn't delivered a publication 'on time') had been previously stated by one of their staff. He published the formal complaint today: https://groups.google.com/a/list.nist.gov/g/pqc-forum/c/4baO2sC9dLA/m/PRlPLUL1BgAJ https://groups.google.com/a/list.nist.gov/g/pqc-forum/c/4baO...
- jart 5y ago
  Well that's what most open source does today. GitHub posted a blog post four days ago that the majority of SSH clients have moved away from aes to chacha. https://github.blog/2021-09-01-improving-git-protocol-security-github/ https://github.blog/2021-09-01-improving-git-protocol-securi... I wouldn't be surprised if the majority of https traffic uses x25519 these days instead of rsa or ℘256. djb is an influential guy.
cryptonector 5y ago
And you still need to review the code yourself and review the compiler's code, and all the object code produced, and test it, and...

nonameiguess 5y ago

This was known to be compromised, though. People using it anyway weren't being fooled because they couldn't audit the code. They were forced by federal standards or they'd lose the ability to sell to the government and go out of business. Your best bet is multiple layers of defense. It may sound ridiculous, but don't use just one VPN/firewall. Make your adversaries compromise multiple vendors. Encrypt several times. That's what the actual DoD does and why the NSA probably doesn't even care. And, of course, the really important information is classified and never hits a publicly reachable network at all, so compromising the supply chain doesn't even help. As a private organization, you probably don't have the option to build an entirely separate network that doesn't touch the Internet and then protect the ingress/egress nodes with your own private military, so I don't know what to tell you there.