> Perhaps the root cause is an issue in the weight-on-wheel sensor inputs that the computers use to transition. The computers need to use redundant sensors so t

> Perhaps the root cause is an issue in the weight-on-wheel sensor inputs that the computers use to transition. The computers need to use redundant sensors so they don't all rely on the same faulty sensor, but maybe the sensors are not appropriately cross-fed or the sensor input combination logic is too different between the computers. This would indeed explain the discrepancies between COM/MON which is what they called asynchronicity (which is a bit different from where my mind went when I read that word the first time). There was no particular fault found in the computers. Maybe wet runway factored in a bit (or some other issue with the runway itself), but this is a common occurence around the world and this was a first on the whole 330/340 family. > The problem with not disconnecting a computer in this situation is that bad inputs from that computer may also cause a crash. But maybe if no other computer is available to take its place the logic should be different, at least during takeoff/landing. Yes, only thing I would add is that they failed in cascade within one second of each other, 3 seconds after main gear touching (and before the nose gear touched down): > Three seconds after the main gear touched down, autobrake system fault was recorded on FDR. One second later, PRIM1/PRIM2/PRIM3 faults were recorded at the same time and the spoilers retracted, as the ground spoiler function was lost. Whether all three should be allowed to be failed within one second then default back to direct law (manual) is a hard question to solve, in this precise case it seems like try again would have maybe worked? Would it always be safe to do a retry? I don't know. This is a super critical phase of flight so retrying doesn't sound safe. Apparently they would have needed 2 functional for full autobrake: > Ground spoilers function requires at least one functional FCPC, arming autobrake requires at least two functional FCPCs, deployment of thrust reversers require unlock signal from either FCPC1 or FCPC3