>They could do whatever ever other company is doing and just looking at all of your data, but Apple didn't want to do that. Note that Apple doesn't do end-to-e

>They could do whatever ever other company is doing and just looking at all of your data, but Apple didn't want to do that. Note that Apple doesn't do end-to-end encryption, there's little evidence they are even thinking about it, and there are other issues that would stand in their way if they had tried to. Under the current system, we get client-side scanning and server-side scanning whenever Apple feels like it. Right now, there's no privacy benefit other than the made-up one some Apple fans invented from thin air. >So they came up with a system that they felt was a good compromise between privacy and trying to stop the spread of CSAM. It's a terrible 'compromise'. In return for a bad precedent, they get a system that catches way less cases than the typical server-based ones. Unless Apple expands the system further to catch these cases too, in which point one should ask how much privacy is really kept.