> I don't really buy that anybody working inside RSA was absolutely convinced that Dual EC was a backdoor. I sort of don't buy that anyone was really even serio

> I don't really buy that anybody working inside RSA was absolutely convinced that Dual EC was a backdoor. I sort of don't buy that anyone was really even seriously paying attention. I guess the second part is a fair point, but for anyone who was paying attention - who read the spec and knew enough about cryptography to understand it - there was no question; Dual EC was clearly, obviously a backdoor[0]. 0: With perhaps the remote possibility of being "not a backdoor" (AKA, a backdoor that NSA (provably?) didn't have keys to) so they could later say "see, you thought Dual EC was a backdoor but it wasn't; clearly people shouldn't believe you when you say we put a backdoor in $LESS_OBVIOUSLY_BACKDOORED_THING".