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> Signal project for instance has argued that a centralized server with Intel SGX "secure enclaves" is the safest we can do. I personally strongly disagree, and
by wolverine876 5y ago
> Signal project for instance has argued that a centralized server with Intel SGX "secure enclaves" is the safest we can do. I personally strongly disagree, and i believe vulnerabilities found since then in Apple/Intel/AMD security chips go against that argument.
If it that isn't 'safest', what do you think is safer (and practical)?
- southerntofu 5y ago> If it that isn't 'safest', what do you think is safer (and practical)? Distributing trust is safer and practical. A single, centralized server will always be vulnerable, whatever defenses in depth you deploy. Standardization and decentralization is more valuable in the long run for privacy/security than any customized efforts. That's what allows us these past years to do PGP over email over Tor onions, transparently via onionMX SRV records (+ a local cache/mapping to prevent lying DNS). Meanwhile, Signal still requires a unique identifier (phone number) to operate and mandates usage of AWS and other privacy-hostile providers to reach their server, and there's nothing we can do about it because they control the entire infrastructure. Some resources on that: - https://gultsch.de/objection.html https://gultsch.de/objection.html <-- A free-software Jabber/XMPP client developer's answer to Signal team's stance against federation and open standards - https://north-shore.info/2019/06/02/signal-fails/ https://north-shore.info/2019/06/02/signal-fails/ <-- A critique of Signal from a militant, non-tech, "security culture" perspective