4 ms·

I bet people would have had no problem with the CSAM on-device scanning if it involved neither Apple employees snooping on your photos nor government reporting.

by kf6nux 5y ago

I bet people would have had no problem with the CSAM on-device scanning if it involved neither Apple employees snooping on your photos nor government reporting. e.g. if they made it so their software simply refused to upload a photo and inform the user why it refused to upload it, then there's no privacy issue (at least not until they do add a backdoor later on).

CubsFan1060 5y ago
Wouldn't this make it simply a way for the people who trade in these sorts of things to get more information about how to avoid them? i.e. my iphone told me this photo was in the database, so I'll start adjusting it until it 'passes', and them I'm free to share it without detection.
- kf6nux 5y ago
  Since Apple shared the algo, people who trade in these things already know how to get around it (just adjust the image so the fingerprint changes). People who trade in these things will probably turn off icloud too. Similarly, governments could take a known image they want banned (say of a national embarrassment), grab some CSAM, tweak the signature on the CSAM to match the photo they want banned, and add the tweaked photo to the CSAM DB.
short_sells_poo 5y ago
I respectfully disagree. In my mind, the fact that Apple employees do first level filtering is a minor problem. The main problem is the precedent this sets: on device scanning is now possible. Before this, if a government asked Apple to scan all the phones for something, Apple could say "we're sorry but we don't have the capability " and they could not be compelled by legal means. Now, a large part of that argument has been eroded. Apple may have added in a few hurdles, but the first crucial step of on-device surveillance capability has been installed and is on path to being normalized. It doesn't matter that they don't do this yet. We are undeniably closer to direct phone surveillance than we have been before.
- kf6nux 5y ago
  The supposition was that, if the scanning had no reporting capability, then Apple could still claim a lack of capability. They could respond to government demands with, "Sorry, our software only blocks uploads. We have no ability to get telemetry on what uploads are blocked or how often." That proposal probably wouldn't work for a lot of reasons though. The largest blocker being that (IIUC) the NCMEC won't share a DB of offending signatures without NDA, so Apple probably can't load it onto consumer devices.

by kf6nux 5y ago

CubsFan1060 5y ago

Wouldn't this make it simply a way for the people who trade in these sorts of things to get more information about how to avoid them? i.e. my iphone told me this photo was in the database, so I'll start adjusting it until it 'passes', and them I'm free to share it without detection.

kf6nux 5y ago
Since Apple shared the algo, people who trade in these things already know how to get around it (just adjust the image so the fingerprint changes). People who trade in these things will probably turn off icloud too. Similarly, governments could take a known image they want banned (say of a national embarrassment), grab some CSAM, tweak the signature on the CSAM to match the photo they want banned, and add the tweaked photo to the CSAM DB.

short_sells_poo 5y ago

I respectfully disagree. In my mind, the fact that Apple employees do first level filtering is a minor problem. The main problem is the precedent this sets: on device scanning is now possible. Before this, if a government asked Apple to scan all the phones for something, Apple could say "we're sorry but we don't have the capability " and they could not be compelled by legal means. Now, a large part of that argument has been eroded. Apple may have added in a few hurdles, but the first crucial step of on-device surveillance capability has been installed and is on path to being normalized. It doesn't matter that they don't do this yet. We are undeniably closer to direct phone surveillance than we have been before.

kf6nux 5y ago
The supposition was that, if the scanning had no reporting capability, then Apple could still claim a lack of capability. They could respond to government demands with, "Sorry, our software only blocks uploads. We have no ability to get telemetry on what uploads are blocked or how often." That proposal probably wouldn't work for a lot of reasons though. The largest blocker being that (IIUC) the NCMEC won't share a DB of offending signatures without NDA, so Apple probably can't load it onto consumer devices.