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This bit stuck out to me: > The second lesson is that “serious” people are always inclined away from worst-case predictions. In bridge building and politics yo

This bit stuck out to me: > The second lesson is that “serious” people are always inclined away from worst-case predictions. In bridge building and politics you can listen to those people. But computer security is adversarial: the conscious goal of attackers is to bring about worst-case outcomes. Are they suggesting that bridge-building and politics are not adversarial? It seems to me that bridges and politics are weak points that are frequently attacked. Or am I missing sarcasm?

Youden 5y ago
Yes, they're suggesting that bridge building isn't adversarial. In bridge building you might often ignore questions like "what if that nearby skyscraper fell on the bridge" or "what if there was a 100-year flood every day for a week". They're scenarios that can conceivably happen but they're very unlikely. In computer security, you wouldn't be so safe because you need to protect your digital bridge from an adversary who has no problems demolishing the nearby figurative skyscraper. Of course there are real-world situations where bridge building is adversarial, if you're in a war-zone for instance. I think the author is discussing more civil situations like "should we spend an extra $1B to make the bridge asteroid proof".
nullc 5y ago
Bridge building is only minimally adversarial. You have to make the bridge strong against chance, natural threats, and casual vandals. You don't have to make the bridge more than minimally strong against attack by a foreign military-- or even some wacko with a van full of ammonium nitrate, and you probably can't (or at least it would be utterly budget breaking to make a serious attempt and doing so). While if you don't make your computer strong against fairly powerful attackers it will get attacked, because the economics of powerful computer attacks make them much less costly to create, almost free to deploy, and relatively low risk of consequences for using them. Fortunately, defending computers from attack also has good economics compared to defending bridges.
- JasonFruit 5y ago
  That clarifies my thinking. Thank you.

Youden 5y ago

Yes, they're suggesting that bridge building isn't adversarial. In bridge building you might often ignore questions like "what if that nearby skyscraper fell on the bridge" or "what if there was a 100-year flood every day for a week". They're scenarios that can conceivably happen but they're very unlikely. In computer security, you wouldn't be so safe because you need to protect your digital bridge from an adversary who has no problems demolishing the nearby figurative skyscraper. Of course there are real-world situations where bridge building is adversarial, if you're in a war-zone for instance. I think the author is discussing more civil situations like "should we spend an extra $1B to make the bridge asteroid proof".

nullc 5y ago

Bridge building is only minimally adversarial. You have to make the bridge strong against chance, natural threats, and casual vandals. You don't have to make the bridge more than minimally strong against attack by a foreign military-- or even some wacko with a van full of ammonium nitrate, and you probably can't (or at least it would be utterly budget breaking to make a serious attempt and doing so). While if you don't make your computer strong against fairly powerful attackers it will get attacked, because the economics of powerful computer attacks make them much less costly to create, almost free to deploy, and relatively low risk of consequences for using them. Fortunately, defending computers from attack also has good economics compared to defending bridges.

JasonFruit 5y ago
That clarifies my thinking. Thank you.