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Physical access doesn't mean access to a meaningful data if it is properly encrypted. I didn't say anything about Apple servers. They can implement a protocol
by mrtksn 5y ago
Physical access doesn't mean access to a meaningful data if it is properly encrypted.
I didn't say anything about Apple servers. They can implement a protocol that works over a wired connection only, gives the device the instruction to match all the files on the device against the given list of fingerprints and returns the results. No match, no results. If there's a match, return just enough to tell what fingerprints matched and nothing more.
- dylan604 5y ago>Physical access doesn't mean access to a meaningful data if it is properly encrypted And what is properly encrypted if you can take advantage of 0-day vulns to unlock the phone so you have access to the data in an unencrypted state. You're not playing this through to the end of what physical access to the device means.
- mrtksn 5y agoThese risks are valid for any device, it has nothing to do with Apple or the feature in question. The police can have a physical access to your devices with or without implementation of this feature. I don't understand what are you arguing for, physical access is not a software thing and it is guarded by exactly the same mechanism that guard the access to you apple(the fruit) in your fridge.
- skoskie 5y agoThis is almost how the new scanning system works.
- mrtksn 5y agoThe difference is huge. Apple’s proposed system scans everyone’s(who uses iCloud) photos and reports them to the authorities(with Apple being a proxy). It’s a snitch/God system. On my proposal, all photos on the device are scanned, scan results(hashes) are stored on device but no attempts to pin you down are made. Once there’s a reason to suspect that you might be a criminal, only then the scan results are evaluated by the phone upon the request of the authorities to check on you as part of the investigation. This is blackbox system.