3 ms·

I want my data to stay encrypted no matter what however I accept that there are people who can do bad things and access to their data could be valuable. So it

by mrtksn 5y ago

I want my data to stay encrypted no matter what however I accept that there are people who can do bad things and access to their data could be valuable. So it is a compromise, the data stays encrypted but the authorities can get an idea about the nature of the data. Then it is up to the person to reveal their data as a part of a cooperation agreement. If there's a CSAM material match, the person can prove innocence by revealing the data(false positives) or the judges can increase the severity of the penalty for not cooperating. Milage may vary depending on your jurisdiction however I think it is a good way to look at someones stuff for offensive material without actually looking at unrelated stuff. So no match, no reason to try to get into the device.

dylan604 5y ago
What are you on about? The comment stated that the authorities have physical access to the device. That means that they can see whatever data you have because it's your device showing it to them. Also, this idea is even more dystopian than the original concept. The original idea was only going to scan content the user chose to push to Apple servers. This current suggests scanning the entire device just because johnny law has the device. That is soooo much worse of an idea.
- mrtksn 5y ago
  Physical access doesn't mean access to a meaningful data if it is properly encrypted. I didn't say anything about Apple servers. They can implement a protocol that works over a wired connection only, gives the device the instruction to match all the files on the device against the given list of fingerprints and returns the results. No match, no results. If there's a match, return just enough to tell what fingerprints matched and nothing more.
  - dylan604 5y ago
    >Physical access doesn't mean access to a meaningful data if it is properly encrypted And what is properly encrypted if you can take advantage of 0-day vulns to unlock the phone so you have access to the data in an unencrypted state. You're not playing this through to the end of what physical access to the device means.
    - mrtksn 5y ago
      These risks are valid for any device, it has nothing to do with Apple or the feature in question. The police can have a physical access to your devices with or without implementation of this feature. I don't understand what are you arguing for, physical access is not a software thing and it is guarded by exactly the same mechanism that guard the access to you apple(the fruit) in your fridge.
  - skoskie 5y ago
    This is almost how the new scanning system works.
    - mrtksn 5y ago
      The difference is huge. Apple’s proposed system scans everyone’s(who uses iCloud) photos and reports them to the authorities(with Apple being a proxy). It’s a snitch/God system. On my proposal, all photos on the device are scanned, scan results(hashes) are stored on device but no attempts to pin you down are made. Once there’s a reason to suspect that you might be a criminal, only then the scan results are evaluated by the phone upon the request of the authorities to check on you as part of the investigation. This is blackbox system.
hfsh 5y ago
> the person can prove innocence Yeah... That's not a thing many people are really comfortable with in societies that are nominally non-authoritarian.
- mrtksn 5y ago
  Innocence over credible suspicion.

by mrtksn 5y ago

dylan604 5y ago

What are you on about? The comment stated that the authorities have physical access to the device. That means that they can see whatever data you have because it's your device showing it to them. Also, this idea is even more dystopian than the original concept. The original idea was only going to scan content the user chose to push to Apple servers. This current suggests scanning the entire device just because johnny law has the device. That is soooo much worse of an idea.

mrtksn 5y ago
Physical access doesn't mean access to a meaningful data if it is properly encrypted. I didn't say anything about Apple servers. They can implement a protocol that works over a wired connection only, gives the device the instruction to match all the files on the device against the given list of fingerprints and returns the results. No match, no results. If there's a match, return just enough to tell what fingerprints matched and nothing more.
- dylan604 5y ago
  >Physical access doesn't mean access to a meaningful data if it is properly encrypted And what is properly encrypted if you can take advantage of 0-day vulns to unlock the phone so you have access to the data in an unencrypted state. You're not playing this through to the end of what physical access to the device means.
  - mrtksn 5y ago
    These risks are valid for any device, it has nothing to do with Apple or the feature in question. The police can have a physical access to your devices with or without implementation of this feature. I don't understand what are you arguing for, physical access is not a software thing and it is guarded by exactly the same mechanism that guard the access to you apple(the fruit) in your fridge.
- skoskie 5y ago
  This is almost how the new scanning system works.
  - mrtksn 5y ago
    The difference is huge. Apple’s proposed system scans everyone’s(who uses iCloud) photos and reports them to the authorities(with Apple being a proxy). It’s a snitch/God system. On my proposal, all photos on the device are scanned, scan results(hashes) are stored on device but no attempts to pin you down are made. Once there’s a reason to suspect that you might be a criminal, only then the scan results are evaluated by the phone upon the request of the authorities to check on you as part of the investigation. This is blackbox system.

hfsh 5y ago

> the person can prove innocence Yeah... That's not a thing many people are really comfortable with in societies that are nominally non-authoritarian.

mrtksn 5y ago
Innocence over credible suspicion.