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My prediction, based on zero evidence whatsoever. They'll implement it server side, and eventually introduce encrypted iCloud photos. But your choice is to al
by CubsFan1060 5y ago
My prediction, based on zero evidence whatsoever. They'll implement it server side, and eventually introduce encrypted iCloud photos. But your choice is to allow this scheme (scan on device before upload) and have E2EE, or to not have E2E encryption and have it scanned on the server side.
- sebiw 5y agoHuh, I never really thought about the possibility that Apple would implement both schemes. I don't think they will go down that path, though. Why: Cost and complexity for Apple would be somewhat higher and the surrounding discussion about capabilities (abuse of the client-side system for other things than CSAM scanning) would persist just because of the existence of client-side scanning. Let's see how this story continues.
- jpxw 5y agoI highly doubt they’d offer a choice like this. 99% of their customers won’t know what these terms mean.
- derefr 5y agoI’m guessing that rather than a choice, it’d be one or the other depending on the market, with most countries getting the server-side version, while totalitarian countries where people are already used to being spied on get the client-side one.
- deleted 5y ago[deleted]
- cwizou 5y agoInteresting thought but Apple never gives choice on much (well except Safari UI now!), and I don't see them giving an explicit choice on this. If they really had for a goal to implement E2EE, I could maybe see this now that you are mentioning it. However if I had to make a guess, they'll go server-side scanning only, and E2EE backups/Photos will never happen. To me it's a pipe dream to believe they would offer E2EE, there's too much international pressure from governments around the world to keep iCloud backups open and going E2EE would trigger unpalatable retaliations.
- rjvir 5y agoI think it's plausible that they'd offer E2EE for all of iCloud. They already do it for iMessage, and it makes it easier to turn down subpoenas if they can credibly claim that they can't even access the data themselves. Likewise, offering an explicit choice also seems plausible. The full E2EE flow might have UX downsides (for example, the user might need to write down a recovery seed phrase on paper), so they might not force all users into that flow.
- cwizou 5y agoBut that's the thing, they have reached a compromise regarding iMessage being "E2EE" by keeping all those avenues (iCloud backups and iMessage on iCloud) that essentially trade E2EE for the convenience. Most users opt-in to the convenience for iMessage making it, for all purposes, no longer E2EE. I don't see them removing that precisely because of iMessage.
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- dylan604 5y agoIs there an alternate where they upload, scan, encrypt only non-offending data? Is there a way to share a public key that only allows for encrypting but not decrypting that would make this a viable option?