> Their client node software is audited though, and the contents of your packets are not accessible to the router. This is why the amount of the possible meddli

> Their client node software is audited though, and the contents of your packets are not accessible to the router. This is why the amount of the possible meddling is limited to a DoS, AFAICT. Normally the coordinator just forwards the keys from your peers, and so doesn't see the contents (the traffic doesn't pass through it, and even if it did it didn't have the key). However, that assumes that the coordinator is being truthful with the network topology that it sends you. It could send you any topology that it wants to! This means that it could start MITMing whenever it wants to by telling you that $SERVER_IP's peer is now actually $COORDINATOR_KEY at $COORDINATOR_IP. Theoretically you could defend against this by, say, running a cronjob that validates that the Wireguard keys are unchanged. But at that point you're not really gaining much compared to just using wg-quick. Tor is different, because the .onion domain name inherently encodes the public key of the site you're connecting to. There is no way to change the key without also changing the URLs that people connect to!