4 ms·

There are very few defensible historical positions that seem to rile up unreasonable criticism more than saying the use of atomic weapons on Japan might not hav

There are very few defensible historical positions that seem to rile up unreasonable criticism more than saying the use of atomic weapons on Japan might not have been justified, usually in the form of uneducated meme responses such as "they would never have surrendered" and "it's easy to say that now." Given that we have evidence that many of those who were there at the time disagreed with the decision and that Japan had already been trying to work towards peace through back-channels, these responses seem to point to a deep need to feel like the United States didn't unjustifiably kill over 100k civilians. There is little question that the bombings were a better strategic choice than Operation Downfall, which would likely have killed more on both sides, but to paint this as the only alternative is a false dilemma. There is even debate among (prominent, non-revisionist) historians and political scientists as to whether the bombings were the primary reason for the surrender -- contemporary letters from within Japan indicate that the Soviet invasion of Manchuria may have actually been the primary factor (though the bombings certainly played some part, and were a larger factor in arguments made by some particular officials).

mezentius 5y ago
I would argue the opposite; criticism of the use of atomic weapons on Japan tends to ramp up during periods of increasing skepticism toward American power (e.g., now). Unfortunately, that criticism is rarely rooted in credible historical argument. I wouldn't say you're arguing from a "uneducated meme response," but I would say that the position that you're taking is the symptom of a post-Vietnam/Watergate narrative regarding CIA conspiracies, the legitimacy of war, and the trustworthiness of American authority. It is, however, not a terribly useful way to approach the context of 1945. While it is possible to find negative quotes from various individuals, such as the aforementioned Halsey, the question is really whether the people involved in the decision were making it in 'good faith' (i.e. out of the perceived necessity of ending the war on rational terms, and not diplomatic stick-shaking or the need to show off one's latest toys). Overwhelmingly, the primary sources argue that they were, and that the most salient concern was ensuring an unconditional surrender to avoid the mistakes made after the last war, in which the sociopolitical structures that enabled militarism were left intact. The "peace" that Japan was offering would have left its extremely dysfunctional political structures intact, and so was considered unacceptable. The number of dead, and manner of their death, must also be seen in the context of the time. It doesn't really matter what we believe about the morality of targeting civilians in 2021; by 1945, that particular Rubicon had been crossed years before, and not just by the Allies. The Japanese Army committed atrocities on such a scale as to poison attitudes about the country to this very day; there is a good reason that people in China or the Philippines may roll their eyes when reading about poor Sadako and her thousand paper cranes (a story popularized by a 1977 Canadian novel). I write this not to minimize any healthy sense of horror or responsibility, but to point out that "it's easy to say that now" is not merely a meme, but in this case responsible historical practice.
- dghlsakjg 5y ago
  I think there is maybe a middle ground. It is entirely possible that the decision to drop the bomb was made in good faith, but that the Japanese were already committed to surrender. The fog of war is very real (as this month has reminded us). In context, the Hiroshima bombing wasn't the most deadly or the most destructive bombing of the war. The Tokyo firebombing takes that honor. Given that the US Army was in the habit of wiping cities off the map at will BEFORE Hiroshima, I wonder how much of an influence the bomb really could have had in 3 days... The other side of it is that American history really undervalues the soviet contribution to the war. The US conventional story fully ignores that the Soviet invasion of Manchuria was cited by Japanese leadership as one of the reasons for full acceptance of the Potsdam declaration. I don't disagree with what you are saying, but the conventional narrative that nuking two cities was the ONLY way to end the war really seems like an oversimplification of a very complex situation. As you mention "total war" was already fully accepted, but I wish that that the complexity of the full situation was taught
  - mezentius 5y ago
    My sticking point with that would be the point about the Japanese having "committed to surrender" prior to the bombs being dropped, which can't really be argued convincingly. The dysfunctional Japanese military hierarchy had trouble committing to anything short of aggressive militarism, which was a major reason for the war being launched in the first place, then continued despite the obvious hopelessness of the Japanese position. Even after the Emperor had officially ordered surrender (via a radio address, in which he explicitly mentioned the influence of the atomic bombs), a group of Japanese officers attempted to depose him in a coup—and this was far from an unprecedented event in a political environment that often punished any public position short of fanatical hawkishness with assassination. To argue that the atomic bombs were not decisive requires ignoring a lot of primary source evidence—including the declaration of surrender read by the Emperor to the Japanese people—in favor of mostly conspiratorial innuendo that is only convincing to those already inclined to be skeptical of contemporary American power structures. Beyond that, the argument seems to assume an omniscience on the part of Allied leaders. What was known at the time was that Japanese soldiers were often fighting to the last man, holding hopeless positions for the purpose of causing as many casualties to the enemy as possible, and that because of this American political will to continue the war was wavering, putting the goal of victory by unconditional surrender in doubt. In that context it was deemed necessary to end the war as quickly as possible. I don't think that anyone would argue that dropping the atomic bombs was the only way to end the war. Alternatives were considered—but it was thought that those alternatives would result in an unsatisfactory postwar settlement, and simply repeat mistakes made in the aftermath of the last great war. In short, if the last years of the war were conducted with great brutality, it was because they were intended to be decisive. (I don't disagree with you that a lot of popular Western histories undervalue contributions by the Soviet Union, but that largely applies to the war against Germany and its European allies, not the war in the Pacific. The Soviet invasion of Manchuria, for example, was probably a contributing factor to the collapse of support for the war, but far from a decisive one.)

mezentius 5y ago

I would argue the opposite; criticism of the use of atomic weapons on Japan tends to ramp up during periods of increasing skepticism toward American power (e.g., now). Unfortunately, that criticism is rarely rooted in credible historical argument. I wouldn't say you're arguing from a "uneducated meme response," but I would say that the position that you're taking is the symptom of a post-Vietnam/Watergate narrative regarding CIA conspiracies, the legitimacy of war, and the trustworthiness of American authority. It is, however, not a terribly useful way to approach the context of 1945. While it is possible to find negative quotes from various individuals, such as the aforementioned Halsey, the question is really whether the people involved in the decision were making it in 'good faith' (i.e. out of the perceived necessity of ending the war on rational terms, and not diplomatic stick-shaking or the need to show off one's latest toys). Overwhelmingly, the primary sources argue that they were, and that the most salient concern was ensuring an unconditional surrender to avoid the mistakes made after the last war, in which the sociopolitical structures that enabled militarism were left intact. The "peace" that Japan was offering would have left its extremely dysfunctional political structures intact, and so was considered unacceptable. The number of dead, and manner of their death, must also be seen in the context of the time. It doesn't really matter what we believe about the morality of targeting civilians in 2021; by 1945, that particular Rubicon had been crossed years before, and not just by the Allies. The Japanese Army committed atrocities on such a scale as to poison attitudes about the country to this very day; there is a good reason that people in China or the Philippines may roll their eyes when reading about poor Sadako and her thousand paper cranes (a story popularized by a 1977 Canadian novel). I write this not to minimize any healthy sense of horror or responsibility, but to point out that "it's easy to say that now" is not merely a meme, but in this case responsible historical practice.

dghlsakjg 5y ago
I think there is maybe a middle ground. It is entirely possible that the decision to drop the bomb was made in good faith, but that the Japanese were already committed to surrender. The fog of war is very real (as this month has reminded us). In context, the Hiroshima bombing wasn't the most deadly or the most destructive bombing of the war. The Tokyo firebombing takes that honor. Given that the US Army was in the habit of wiping cities off the map at will BEFORE Hiroshima, I wonder how much of an influence the bomb really could have had in 3 days... The other side of it is that American history really undervalues the soviet contribution to the war. The US conventional story fully ignores that the Soviet invasion of Manchuria was cited by Japanese leadership as one of the reasons for full acceptance of the Potsdam declaration. I don't disagree with what you are saying, but the conventional narrative that nuking two cities was the ONLY way to end the war really seems like an oversimplification of a very complex situation. As you mention "total war" was already fully accepted, but I wish that that the complexity of the full situation was taught
- mezentius 5y ago
  My sticking point with that would be the point about the Japanese having "committed to surrender" prior to the bombs being dropped, which can't really be argued convincingly. The dysfunctional Japanese military hierarchy had trouble committing to anything short of aggressive militarism, which was a major reason for the war being launched in the first place, then continued despite the obvious hopelessness of the Japanese position. Even after the Emperor had officially ordered surrender (via a radio address, in which he explicitly mentioned the influence of the atomic bombs), a group of Japanese officers attempted to depose him in a coup—and this was far from an unprecedented event in a political environment that often punished any public position short of fanatical hawkishness with assassination. To argue that the atomic bombs were not decisive requires ignoring a lot of primary source evidence—including the declaration of surrender read by the Emperor to the Japanese people—in favor of mostly conspiratorial innuendo that is only convincing to those already inclined to be skeptical of contemporary American power structures. Beyond that, the argument seems to assume an omniscience on the part of Allied leaders. What was known at the time was that Japanese soldiers were often fighting to the last man, holding hopeless positions for the purpose of causing as many casualties to the enemy as possible, and that because of this American political will to continue the war was wavering, putting the goal of victory by unconditional surrender in doubt. In that context it was deemed necessary to end the war as quickly as possible. I don't think that anyone would argue that dropping the atomic bombs was the only way to end the war. Alternatives were considered—but it was thought that those alternatives would result in an unsatisfactory postwar settlement, and simply repeat mistakes made in the aftermath of the last great war. In short, if the last years of the war were conducted with great brutality, it was because they were intended to be decisive. (I don't disagree with you that a lot of popular Western histories undervalue contributions by the Soviet Union, but that largely applies to the war against Germany and its European allies, not the war in the Pacific. The Soviet invasion of Manchuria, for example, was probably a contributing factor to the collapse of support for the war, but far from a decisive one.)