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The history does not credibly support this analysis. For Halsey to say that the Japanese were on "the verge of surrender" is somewhat misleading; while the Japa

The history does not credibly support this analysis. For Halsey to say that the Japanese were on "the verge of surrender" is somewhat misleading; while the Japanese may have been willing to seek a negotiated end to the conflict, they were certainly not willing to surrender unconditionally, and in fact were throwing away an appalling number of lives in India, New Guinea, and islands all across the Pacific to prove this. An unconditional surrender was seen as necessary because the Western Allies believed that they needed a free hand in the postwar period to drastically restructure the political systems of the Axis countries and prevent future militarism. If you look at the example of the interwar period (in which negotiated truces had repeatedly failed in the face of determined militarism) and then note the result of the postwar period for both the Japanese and German economies, it would be very hard to argue that the Allies were wrong.

mcguire 5y ago
The conditions the Japanese Supreme War Council (made up of the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Minister of War, the Minister of the Navy, and the Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs; the only higher authority was the Emperor) were willing to accept were: 1. The Emperor continued unmolested as the head of state, 2. Japan was responsible for its own disarmament, 3. There would be no occupation, and 4. Japan would conduct its own war crime trials.
- Wohlf 5y ago
  This was not possible, the Allies had all agreed on unconditional surrender so no separate peace could be carved out.
  - mezentius 5y ago
    Yes—and beyond the important question of separate peace, those conditions were seen as too onerous given the perceived need to transform Japan's political and social institutions after the war. Beyond this was the political requirement to address widespread and well-known atrocities committed by the Japanese Army, as well as the failure of voluntary arms control treaties in the interwar period. In the end, of course, the Allies did decide to leave the Emperor in place as nominal head of state—but had not decided to do so before the Japanese capitulated, and certainly did not want to commit themselves to that course.
  - mcguire 5y ago
    Exactly. And the Allies included the Soviets, who were thus rather cold to aiding a negotiated surrender.

mcguire 5y ago

The conditions the Japanese Supreme War Council (made up of the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Minister of War, the Minister of the Navy, and the Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs; the only higher authority was the Emperor) were willing to accept were: 1. The Emperor continued unmolested as the head of state, 2. Japan was responsible for its own disarmament, 3. There would be no occupation, and 4. Japan would conduct its own war crime trials.

Wohlf 5y ago
This was not possible, the Allies had all agreed on unconditional surrender so no separate peace could be carved out.
- mezentius 5y ago
  Yes—and beyond the important question of separate peace, those conditions were seen as too onerous given the perceived need to transform Japan's political and social institutions after the war. Beyond this was the political requirement to address widespread and well-known atrocities committed by the Japanese Army, as well as the failure of voluntary arms control treaties in the interwar period. In the end, of course, the Allies did decide to leave the Emperor in place as nominal head of state—but had not decided to do so before the Japanese capitulated, and certainly did not want to commit themselves to that course.
- mcguire 5y ago
  Exactly. And the Allies included the Soviets, who were thus rather cold to aiding a negotiated surrender.