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I thought with enough matches Apple would decrypt your images, at which point they would be able to verify if they were CSAM (and notify authorities) or realise
by crummy 5y ago
I thought with enough matches Apple would decrypt your images, at which point they would be able to verify if they were CSAM (and notify authorities) or realise they weren't and that a government had tried to trick them (and do nothing or go public with this information). Is this not how it works?
- Jtsummers 5y agoThat is how they've described the system. After 30 or so matches, they'll be able to decrypt a version (presumably scaled down, the description is vague) of the images and manually review them. With the present system targeting CSAM imagery, unless the images you have match their expectation of matching images, they wouldn't pass it on to law enforcement. This is where the slippery slope argument comes in. Apple would have to actively cooperate with governments to both detect and report other kinds of images. So if Tiananmen Square images were showing up in the review pile, Apple would have to know to pass those on to the Chinese government and be willing to. The only other way they'd be passed on is if Apple drops the manual review portion.
- lazide 5y agoNot quite. Any manual review system is going to have infrastructure to pick reviewers, route the data around, etc. it would not be hard, and could be done under the radar, to intercept data for specific targets in a way that wouldn’t arouse suspicion, and it would be awfully hard to prove it had happened too.
- Jtsummers 5y agoSo you're agreeing with me. Apple would have to actively cooperate by providing reviewers who would go along with the kind of media besides CP that nations may want to detect, or Apple would have to actively cooperate by simply passing matches on and bypassing the review process. But Apple would have to be the ones doing it either way.
- lazide 5y agoOr one or more employees who is compromised.