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thanks for the context, that pretty much answered all my follow-up questions. :) The "weird old systems" case sounds like something were maybe it could be requ
by detaro 5y ago
thanks for the context, that pretty much answered all my follow-up questions. :)
The "weird old systems" case sounds like something were maybe it could be required for DV-certs?
- tialaramex 5y agoLogging is only valuable if it's enforced. A mandate ("You must log everything") with no enforcement ("... but we won't check") is futile. At the very most maybe it adds one more to what is likely a long list of problems with a CA during a distrust discussion. In effect there is already a requirement on CAs to internally track everything they issue, because there are numerous circumstances where the question, "What was issued with these criteria?" is pertinent and being unable to answer honestly is unacceptable. So, it doesn't make much sense to introduce logging as a policy requirement. I can't say it won't happen but I don't think it's useful. In contrast improvements to client software to actually examine SCTs in more clients and eventually to gossip about what SCTs they've seen are valuable because they improve the practical enforcement of logging. What we see today is that most incidents are logged. A CA will issue something that shouldn't exist, and independent researchers will see that in the logs, but the CA's own tools didn't discover this, not only before logging but often afterwards. Under existing policy the pre-certificate is a misissuance, even if the "real" certificate never existed we can't prove that, so the CA violated policy, but it's a problem that some of them will only realise this after it's reported by somebody else rather than flagging it immediately and self-reporting the violation. So this is reassuring because it matches my assumption that the CA operators are like most of us, they are lazy and incompetent but they aren't malevolent. They can't be bothered to do it properly, they don't remember how to do it properly, but they aren't intentionally doing a bad job, which means that they can improve if given better tools and procedures to avoid trouble.
- detaro 5y agoYes, it only makes sense if organizations monitor their domains for unexpected certificates and actually react to that, which probably not enough people do.