4 ms·
Oops. People pay a lot of money to MarkMonitor because their promise is to not make such mistakes.
by detaro 5y ago
Oops. People pay a lot of money to MarkMonitor because their promise is to not make such mistakes.
- toast0 5y agoWhen I was a customer, screwing up a parking page isn't the kind of mistake my employer was paying them not to make. My employer was paying them not to let outside groups change our domain's DNS settings. But that was for domains we were actively using. I don't even remember if we had a parking page on the domains we only had to sit on; if we did, while it wouldn't have been great, it also wouldn't have been a big deal for them to show something attacker controlled for a little while. Parked domains weren't in active use, didn't have links going to them, and probably shouldn't seem credible to others. I think we might have set up the parked domains to just redirect to our main website, but yeah.
- agwa 5y ago> it also wouldn't have been a big deal for them to show something attacker controlled for a little while This is understating the risk. If an attacker obtains control over a website for even a brief period of time, they can go to a certificate authority and obtain a domain validation for the domain (including all subdomains) that's valid for one year. At the end of that year, they can use the domain validation to obtain an SSL certificate that's valid for up to one year, even if they no longer control the website. This means that following a brief takeover, the domain continues to be vulnerable to attack for two years, which would be a problem if a parked domain is transitioned to active use during that time.
- detaro 5y agoNowadays a bit lessened by CT logs, so you (or MM) can at least notice and cause the cert to be revoked.
- agwa 5y agoYes, although the attacker can defer logging the certificate to CT until the moment before the certificate is used in an attack, so you would not have much time to respond.
- detaro 5y agoHow? The CA submits records (precertificates) to the logs before it signs the cert.
- agwa 5y agoPrecertificates are optional. Alternatively, the CA can skip creating a precertificate. The certificate would not contain any embedded SCTs. Instead, the certificate is logged using the add-chain endpoint[1], and the returned SCTs are delivered via an extension to the TLS handshake or an extension in a stapled OCSP response[2] [1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6962#section-4.1 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6962#section-4.1 [2] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6962#section-3.3 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6962#section-3.3
- deleted 5y ago[deleted]
- detaro 5y agothanks, I didn't know both steps (pre-cert and actual cert submission into logs) were optional.
- tialaramex 5y agoLogging is not a policy requirement of the trust stores. It's a condition for your certificates to work in some popular browsers (notably Chrome and Safari) but not a policy requirement. This is on purpose. Google themselves for example will get a certificate issued, say, today, for shiny-new-google-product.example and then only at the last moment do they log that certificate when spinning up the web site https://shiny-new-google-product.example/ https://shiny-new-google-product.example/ to launch shiny-new-google-product -- you can't find out about it in the CT logs because it wasn't in there earlier. Now, the readily available and especially free certificates most people use are logged before issuance as you describe using the poisoned "pre-certificate" feature from RFC 6962 (in theory this will one day be replaced by a 6962bis actual pre-certificate document rather than poisoned X.509 certs) but that is not at all mandatory, it's just convenient because it requires no workflow changes. You get a certificate, it's a bit bigger (it has SCTs baked inside it) and it just works. If you do things the hard way, you must ensure your server application software understands what SCTs are and can send them to clients as necessary. You save some bytes talking to clients that don't want the SCTs, and you get to have this just-in-time logging behaviour if you want that. The other reason it isn't against policy to issue without logging is that some archaic systems that are subject the Web PKI rules but aren't actually talking to the public Internet, and especially to web browsers, do not have logging, it's not a thing for them. This will probably go away in the next few years, these systems age out, but they still existed when I last looked.
- jstanley 5y ago> At the end of that year, they can use the domain validation to obtain an SSL certificate that's valid for up to one year, even if they no longer control the website. Can you explain this further? I don't understand. Are you saying they could MITM the request that the CA makes to the website when it tries to do domain valudation? If that's the case, why is it limited to 2 years? Why couldn't they continue to do this indefinitely?
- agwa 5y agoNo, they don't have to MitM the CA's domain validation request. While they have brief control over the website, they use domain validation method 3.2.2.4.18 (Agreed-Upon Change to Website v2)[1] or 3.2.2.4.19 (Agreed-Upon Change to Website - ACME)[2] to legitimately complete domain validation by making a change to the website. Due to domain validation reuse[3], the certificate doesn't have to be issued right away. The attacker can wait and request the certificate up to 398 days later, without having to do domain validation again. [1] https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/blob/cda0f92ee70121fd5d692685b97ebb6669c74fb7/docs/BR.md#322418-agreed-upon-change-to-website-v2 https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/blob/cda0f92ee70121fd... [2] https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/blob/cda0f92ee70121fd5d692685b97ebb6669c74fb7/docs/BR.md#322419-agreed-upon-change-to-website---acme https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/blob/cda0f92ee70121fd... [3] https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/blob/cda0f92ee70121fd5d692685b97ebb6669c74fb7/docs/BR.md#421-performing-identification-and-authentication-functions https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/blob/cda0f92ee70121fd...