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That's a very interesting system! I've been reading about it but I'm not sure how it applies. > (if they have a preference over which action will be taken) are

That's a very interesting system! I've been reading about it but I'm not sure how it applies. > (if they have a preference over which action will be taken) are incentivised to give more extreme answers. With yes and no answers, how can answers become more extreme? If you are asked "Is this misleading? Yes/No" and it's only marked as misleading when "Yes" is the majority, then you are incentivized to answer with your true opinion. If you want the post to be marked misleading, then answering yes increases the chance that it is marked as such. The bayesian truth sereum information score makes sense when you are trying to reward people for truthfully answering your questions; for example by paying them [0]. When asking "Is this misleading?", how do you use the information score to compute who won? [0] - http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/cs286r/courses/fall10/papers/DW08.pdf http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/cs286r/courses/fall10/papers/DW0...

chriswarbo 5y ago
For yes/no questions I think (but haven't checked the math) that the incentive is to shift the distribution closer to my opinion. If my opinion is, say, 75% that it's misleading, then the truthful response would be a coin toss with bias 75%. However, if I know my answer will affect censorship, etc. then I may try to predict the resulting distribution, and vote yes if I predict it's less than 75%, and no if I predict it's more than 75%. For example, I may be more "trigger happy" if I think people are more likely to believe something uncritically; I may be more of a "devil's advocate" if I think something is under-represented, or less likely to be taken seriously.