> I'm not sure what you mean by an unassembled bow here, or more specifically, what the bow is that you're referring to. Throughout your responses, you've down

> I'm not sure what you mean by an unassembled bow here, or more specifically, what the bow is that you're referring to. Throughout your responses, you've downplayed the nature of the on-device "scanner/analyzer/whatever" and have seemingly implied that because that one component is pretty innocuous on its own, it shouldn't be a big deal. "The bow" here is the end-to-end solution Apple is implementing. The point I'm trying to make is that the on-device component must be judged based on how it interacts with the whole system and should not be downplayed just because it appears innocuous in isolation. > I don't understand your question, and I don't fully understand your compromised position. Generally speaking, E2E encryption means that the owner of the data holds the keys and nothing else can read that data except for the owner. In the system we're discussing, any subsequent application of "E2E" encryption would be meaningless, because Apple stands between you (the first "E") and their servers (the second "E").