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> Scanning your system for illegal stuff has a very different connotation And yet, when you examine the end-to-end system, this is exactly what they're doing.

> Scanning your system for illegal stuff has a very different connotation And yet, when you examine the end-to-end system, this is exactly what they're doing. If I have a long, flexible piece of wood that's capable of bending, and a very strong string, and a dowel rod, feathers, and a sharp piece of metal, I can claim that "I just have a flexible piece of wood" or "I just have feather". But if what I really possess is an unassembled bow, and upon assembly I can use it to fire arrows, suddenly I have a weapon. It would be disingenuous to claim that the individual parts I have are all harmless when their sole intent is to be used in combination in a manner that can inflict harm or death. > So it seems therefore that this is being done to allow for full encryption And to what end? What value would such a feature provide when the first end has been compromised?

azinman2 5y ago
I'm not sure what you mean by an unassembled bow here, or more specifically, what the bow is that you're referring to. People have worries that this could lead everything from to identifying dissidents that might be in possession of specific photos to identifying copyrighted materials on your device whether they were going to iCloud or not. The construction of the system negates both of these things. It matters if it's tied to iCloud or not. Otherwise it is 'scanning' your system, which in this case, isn't something that is actually built anymore than it could be built at any time. It's not like Apple can't build whatever software/hardware it wants or needs. This was just as true before as it is now. To me the bigger issue is the worry about what hashes will it be... will that expand past the intersection of two CP databases. Maybe? Maybe not? But that risk was the same before (or even worse since it could have been done fully in secret and targeted to specific individuals or regions) on a pure server-side solution. All this work isn't being done just to save some CPU cycles in Apple datacenter. >And to what end? What value would such a feature provide when the first end has been compromised? I don't understand your question, and I don't fully understand your compromised position. If the concern is finding all kinds of bad things on your phone independent of this CP thing, that always could have been the case and what was built isn't enough for that (it's hashes not classifiers, the db is distributed to the entire world and verifiable that its the same on all devices, you could always see the network traffic despite turning off iCloud services, etc).
- haswell 5y ago
  > I'm not sure what you mean by an unassembled bow here, or more specifically, what the bow is that you're referring to. Throughout your responses, you've downplayed the nature of the on-device "scanner/analyzer/whatever" and have seemingly implied that because that one component is pretty innocuous on its own, it shouldn't be a big deal. "The bow" here is the end-to-end solution Apple is implementing. The point I'm trying to make is that the on-device component must be judged based on how it interacts with the whole system and should not be downplayed just because it appears innocuous in isolation. > I don't understand your question, and I don't fully understand your compromised position. Generally speaking, E2E encryption means that the owner of the data holds the keys and nothing else can read that data except for the owner. In the system we're discussing, any subsequent application of "E2E" encryption would be meaningless, because Apple stands between you (the first "E") and their servers (the second "E").

azinman2 5y ago

I'm not sure what you mean by an unassembled bow here, or more specifically, what the bow is that you're referring to. People have worries that this could lead everything from to identifying dissidents that might be in possession of specific photos to identifying copyrighted materials on your device whether they were going to iCloud or not. The construction of the system negates both of these things. It matters if it's tied to iCloud or not. Otherwise it is 'scanning' your system, which in this case, isn't something that is actually built anymore than it could be built at any time. It's not like Apple can't build whatever software/hardware it wants or needs. This was just as true before as it is now. To me the bigger issue is the worry about what hashes will it be... will that expand past the intersection of two CP databases. Maybe? Maybe not? But that risk was the same before (or even worse since it could have been done fully in secret and targeted to specific individuals or regions) on a pure server-side solution. All this work isn't being done just to save some CPU cycles in Apple datacenter. >And to what end? What value would such a feature provide when the first end has been compromised? I don't understand your question, and I don't fully understand your compromised position. If the concern is finding all kinds of bad things on your phone independent of this CP thing, that always could have been the case and what was built isn't enough for that (it's hashes not classifiers, the db is distributed to the entire world and verifiable that its the same on all devices, you could always see the network traffic despite turning off iCloud services, etc).

haswell 5y ago
> I'm not sure what you mean by an unassembled bow here, or more specifically, what the bow is that you're referring to. Throughout your responses, you've downplayed the nature of the on-device "scanner/analyzer/whatever" and have seemingly implied that because that one component is pretty innocuous on its own, it shouldn't be a big deal. "The bow" here is the end-to-end solution Apple is implementing. The point I'm trying to make is that the on-device component must be judged based on how it interacts with the whole system and should not be downplayed just because it appears innocuous in isolation. > I don't understand your question, and I don't fully understand your compromised position. Generally speaking, E2E encryption means that the owner of the data holds the keys and nothing else can read that data except for the owner. In the system we're discussing, any subsequent application of "E2E" encryption would be meaningless, because Apple stands between you (the first "E") and their servers (the second "E").