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No need for FUD. Symantec for many years led shoddy certificate validations. As a result of many audits finding inappropriately assigned certs the security comm
by zamadatix 5y ago
No need for FUD. Symantec for many years led shoddy certificate validations. As a result of many audits finding inappropriately assigned certs the security community at large decided to just stop trusting them rather than continuously find issues in audits. That being said the audits had already been done, the harm of just immediately distrusting the CA wholesale would be orders of magnitudes more than the harm of whatever cert assignments slipped though the audits. A target date for the distrust needed to be chosen, at the same time the security community had been shifting to a maximum of <3 years on TLS certificates and about the same for code signing certificates with a preference they be even less than that farther in the future. The combination of these 2 goals to harden certificate trust going forward leads to the reasoning of why distrust it after all of these years, any certificates that were trusted prior to the distrust of new Symantec certs should be well expired.
Clearly quick reaction is possible if deemed necessary, new certs were almost immediately untrusted following concensus on action against Symantec. Should the situation have been more dire (e.g. a leak of the CA keys) a more dire course of action may have been warranted.
- hamburglar 5y agoI'm not an expert on code signing, but wouldn't a code-signing cert with a 2 year lifetime mean that none of the apps it signs can be used for more than 2 years? Or is the code-signing valid as long as the signature was generated within the signing cert's lifetime?
- marcan_42 5y agoThe latter. Code signing relies on a timestamping service to certify that the signature was made within the certificate's lifetime.
- zinekeller 5y agoThat assumes that the time-stamping certificate isn't revoked (not expired, revoked). Code signing is a mess.
- corty 5y agoSame problem as for document signatures, one needs a trustworthy timestamping service certifying the time of signature, so the client may check if the whole certificate chain might have been valid at the time. This means that you need far more extensive CA and revocation databases than for TLS, because you need to keep all that historical data.