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> Isn't this in itself a win for reducing distribution of CSAM? The content is already out of public view. Making CSAM illegal isn't merely about preventing th

> Isn't this in itself a win for reducing distribution of CSAM? The content is already out of public view. Making CSAM illegal isn't merely about preventing the material from being publicly visible. Having a ring of child abusers privately circulating CSAM outside of clearnet by using Tor or by exchanging thumb drives is just as damaging of an act to law enforcement agencies, because it means the market can still exist in a different environment. There will always be other ways to distribute CSAM, but what the law sees as within its reach in order to prevent the spread of CSAM to the greatest extent possible is to pressure companies that offer user data storage into increasing the amount of scanning for such material. > you cannot sacrifice an entire population's rights to catch the relatively few bad actors. Unfortunately this is a matter of public opinion, and there are many people out there that would argue instead that we need to give up some amount of privacy in order to better protect the human population. > There's already companies that do offer E2EE encryption and there is no law requirements to scan for CSAM in the US. What are the names of these companies? Are you sure there isn't a clause in their terms of service stating they will give up your data to law enforcement if requested, including the contents of encrypted files? Even though there is no law compelling companies to scan for CSAM, the law is not going to let any of them store CSAM for an indefinite period of time. That would defeat the entire purpose of outlawing CSAM to begin with. Regardless of what's legally required of them, it's in the companies' best interests to ensure that the data stays off their servers. No matter what moral stance they take in deciding to implement CSAM scanning, they're not going to take the risk of being found criminally liable for the data they're storing.

least 5y ago
> Making CSAM illegal isn't merely about preventing the material from being publicly visible. Having a ring of child abusers privately circulating CSAM outside of clearnet by using Tor or by exchanging thumb drives is just as damaging of an act to law enforcement agencies, because it means the market can still exist in a different environment. There will always be other ways to distribute CSAM, but what the law sees as within its reach in order to prevent the spread of CSAM to the greatest extent possible is to pressure companies that offer user data storage into increasing the amount of scanning for such material. How do you know what "the law" sees as being within its reach? Law enforcement and rights are always going to be at odds with each other. > Unfortunately this is a matter of public opinion, and there are many people out there that would argue instead that we need to give up some amount of privacy in order to better protect the human population. I don't really care so much about this hypothetical public opinion. Refrain from using this unknowable nebula of consensus to argue your points for you. Even if there is massive consensus that would not change my argument that it is wrong. If a company has no means of which to know what is stored on their servers, they have no reason to presume that it is illicit material, even if it in fact is. Removing those liabilities by restricting what Apple can know has been how Apple's been operating for quite some time. Even this implementation could be argued that this is what Apple is attempting to do. The issue is that ultimately, Apple is installing software on your device to work only as adversary to its user by violating their privacy. > What are the names of these companies? Are you sure there isn't a clause in their terms of service stating they will give up your data to law enforcement if requested, including the contents of encrypted files? By definition if the third party can decrypt your files it is not end to end encrypted, the third party in this case being Apple. Many files upload to iCloud already are encrypted but since Apple also has access to the key it can decrypt and examine the contents of the files on its servers. With E2EE the only person with access to the private key would be yourself. They could certainly hand over the encrypted files and if law enforcement gained access to your private key they could then decrypt those files, but (hypothetically) not until after they've obtained the private key.

least 5y ago

> Making CSAM illegal isn't merely about preventing the material from being publicly visible. Having a ring of child abusers privately circulating CSAM outside of clearnet by using Tor or by exchanging thumb drives is just as damaging of an act to law enforcement agencies, because it means the market can still exist in a different environment. There will always be other ways to distribute CSAM, but what the law sees as within its reach in order to prevent the spread of CSAM to the greatest extent possible is to pressure companies that offer user data storage into increasing the amount of scanning for such material. How do you know what "the law" sees as being within its reach? Law enforcement and rights are always going to be at odds with each other. > Unfortunately this is a matter of public opinion, and there are many people out there that would argue instead that we need to give up some amount of privacy in order to better protect the human population. I don't really care so much about this hypothetical public opinion. Refrain from using this unknowable nebula of consensus to argue your points for you. Even if there is massive consensus that would not change my argument that it is wrong. If a company has no means of which to know what is stored on their servers, they have no reason to presume that it is illicit material, even if it in fact is. Removing those liabilities by restricting what Apple can know has been how Apple's been operating for quite some time. Even this implementation could be argued that this is what Apple is attempting to do. The issue is that ultimately, Apple is installing software on your device to work only as adversary to its user by violating their privacy. > What are the names of these companies? Are you sure there isn't a clause in their terms of service stating they will give up your data to law enforcement if requested, including the contents of encrypted files? By definition if the third party can decrypt your files it is not end to end encrypted, the third party in this case being Apple. Many files upload to iCloud already are encrypted but since Apple also has access to the key it can decrypt and examine the contents of the files on its servers. With E2EE the only person with access to the private key would be yourself. They could certainly hand over the encrypted files and if law enforcement gained access to your private key they could then decrypt those files, but (hypothetically) not until after they've obtained the private key.