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>I already gave one example of something they could do to help curtail illegal behavior without requiring an invasion of privacy. You said they should add a re

by slg 5y ago

>I already gave one example of something they could do to help curtail illegal behavior without requiring an invasion of privacy. You said they should add a reporting mechanism, that won't stop anything because if a person already has knowledge that this content is being shared, they could just report it to the authorities. There is no reason to report it to Apple. Like you said, "Apple's role is not the police". >Some people also don't want to support a company that they know is enabling surveillance, which is what Apple is doing here. I acknowledged that in my first comment. Some people feel one way. Some people feel another. Apple is acknowledging both sides of this while you are only acknowledging one. >A violation of your right to privacy is a violation no matter how small you might think it is. They don't need to invade our privacy at all. This type of black and white ideology can't function in the real world. All rights have limits and the general rule is that your rights end when they start infringing on my rights. Your right to privacy does not supersede my right to not be a victim of a crime. >Everything leaving the device isn't E2EE and this doesn't "allow" for everything leaving the device to be E2EE. Stop pushing this false dichotomy. Everything I have seen from people in the know has suggested that this is a step on the path to Apple enabling E2EE encryption for iCloud. >Things can be E2EE without any invasion of privacy whatsoever and there are other options to help combat CSAM that aren't violations of a user's privacy. Stop pretending like this is the only option when it's clearly not. Do you have an actual suggestion that you think will cut down on CSAM beyond providing a redundant reporting system?

least 5y ago
> You said they should add a reporting mechanism, that won't stop anything because if a person already has knowledge that this content is being shared, they could just report it to the authorities. There is no reason to report it to Apple. Like you said, "Apple's role is not the police". Recognition isn't something people would always be able to immediately do with CSAM imagery so Apple, which has already created a tool to recognize it, can assist with that. It can also create tools to reduce the overhead of reporting. If you make it easier to report, more people will do it. You're assuming that anyone that ever encounters CSAM would go out of their way to report it, which simply isn't true. > This type of black and white ideology can't function in the real world. All rights have limits and the general rule is that your rights end when they start infringing on my rights. Your right to privacy does not supersede my right to not be a victim of a crime. My right to privacy is not an infringement of your rights so this argument has no bearing in reality. Law enforcement requires probable cause to get permission to surveil the population and there's been countless cases thrown out because of this violation, which, as it turns out, was even tested in the context of technology interfacing with NCMEC. > Everything I have seen from people in the know has suggested that this is a step on the path to Apple enabling E2EE encryption for iCloud. Those people are also pushing the same false dichotomy that you are. There is no technical reason that this is required to enable E2EE for iCloud, it's purely speculation as to why Apple would roll this surveillance tool out, as a compromise to having a fully encrypted system. > Do you have an actual suggestion that you think will cut down on CSAM beyond providing a redundant reporting system? The reporting system isn't redundant, but beyond that, the impetus isn't on the person whose rights are being violated to offer solutions to replace that violation.
- nonbirithm 5y ago
  > If you make it easier to report, more people will do it. The law isn't going to rely on people that might or might not report CSAM if they see it. Average users have no obligation to report CSAM, unlike the law and the companies that store user data. If the law finds CSAM themselves, they will always report it, and in their eyes that only improves the chances of a successful conviction. > My right to privacy is not an infringement of your rights so this argument has no bearing in reality. The law would argue that a right to privacy that includes the ability to store CSAM privately is infringing on the rights of others, because allowing CSAM to be consumed and distributed creates a market that incentivizes the further abuse of children. CSAM cannot be produced without CSA taking place, which makes it a part of that cycle. > There is no technical reason that this is required to enable E2EE for iCloud, it's purely speculation as to why Apple would roll this surveillance tool out, as a compromise to having a fully encrypted system. That is Apple's own fault for failing to precisely explain their reasoning for designing the system the way they did, and the confusion was entirely preventable.
  - least 5y ago
    The legislative branch might try to do something but it’d inevitably be tested in our judicial system. We can only speculate how the courts might rule in such cases but in just a philosophical sense there is no argument here.
    - nonbirithm 5y ago
      Here is an opinion from the district court of Northern California. Among other things, it mentions that Microsoft was not acting as a government agency to conduct CSAM scanning, and that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to private entities. It might be worth reading through for some of the other people discussing this issue, since it happened fairly recently (December of 2020). https://casetext.com/case/united-states-v-bohannon-15 https://casetext.com/case/united-states-v-bohannon-15
      - least 5y ago

by slg 5y ago

least 5y ago

> You said they should add a reporting mechanism, that won't stop anything because if a person already has knowledge that this content is being shared, they could just report it to the authorities. There is no reason to report it to Apple. Like you said, "Apple's role is not the police". Recognition isn't something people would always be able to immediately do with CSAM imagery so Apple, which has already created a tool to recognize it, can assist with that. It can also create tools to reduce the overhead of reporting. If you make it easier to report, more people will do it. You're assuming that anyone that ever encounters CSAM would go out of their way to report it, which simply isn't true. > This type of black and white ideology can't function in the real world. All rights have limits and the general rule is that your rights end when they start infringing on my rights. Your right to privacy does not supersede my right to not be a victim of a crime. My right to privacy is not an infringement of your rights so this argument has no bearing in reality. Law enforcement requires probable cause to get permission to surveil the population and there's been countless cases thrown out because of this violation, which, as it turns out, was even tested in the context of technology interfacing with NCMEC. > Everything I have seen from people in the know has suggested that this is a step on the path to Apple enabling E2EE encryption for iCloud. Those people are also pushing the same false dichotomy that you are. There is no technical reason that this is required to enable E2EE for iCloud, it's purely speculation as to why Apple would roll this surveillance tool out, as a compromise to having a fully encrypted system. > Do you have an actual suggestion that you think will cut down on CSAM beyond providing a redundant reporting system? The reporting system isn't redundant, but beyond that, the impetus isn't on the person whose rights are being violated to offer solutions to replace that violation.

nonbirithm 5y ago
> If you make it easier to report, more people will do it. The law isn't going to rely on people that might or might not report CSAM if they see it. Average users have no obligation to report CSAM, unlike the law and the companies that store user data. If the law finds CSAM themselves, they will always report it, and in their eyes that only improves the chances of a successful conviction. > My right to privacy is not an infringement of your rights so this argument has no bearing in reality. The law would argue that a right to privacy that includes the ability to store CSAM privately is infringing on the rights of others, because allowing CSAM to be consumed and distributed creates a market that incentivizes the further abuse of children. CSAM cannot be produced without CSA taking place, which makes it a part of that cycle. > There is no technical reason that this is required to enable E2EE for iCloud, it's purely speculation as to why Apple would roll this surveillance tool out, as a compromise to having a fully encrypted system. That is Apple's own fault for failing to precisely explain their reasoning for designing the system the way they did, and the confusion was entirely preventable.
- least 5y ago
  The legislative branch might try to do something but it’d inevitably be tested in our judicial system. We can only speculate how the courts might rule in such cases but in just a philosophical sense there is no argument here.
  - nonbirithm 5y ago
    Here is an opinion from the district court of Northern California. Among other things, it mentions that Microsoft was not acting as a government agency to conduct CSAM scanning, and that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to private entities. It might be worth reading through for some of the other people discussing this issue, since it happened fairly recently (December of 2020). https://casetext.com/case/united-states-v-bohannon-15 https://casetext.com/case/united-states-v-bohannon-15
    - least 5y ago