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> "They don't need to worry about it" may be enough for you, but it is not a satisfactory moral answer for a lot of people. It shouldn't be tough to understand

• deleted 5y ago
  [deleted]
• slg 5y ago
  >You're not "actively" enabling illegal activity. I don't want to get into a semantic debate about the word "actively". Suffice it to say that some people don't want to work on a product or support a company that they know is enabling criminal behavior while also refusing to do anything to curtail that illegal behavior. >It shouldn't be tough to understand that people don't want their rights trampled on to enable surveillance. Apple recognizes this. Once again, this is why they are doing this on device and not in the cloud like other providers. They are trying to do the scanning in a way that is invades privacy the least. >How does this solve the issue, exactly? The fact that it's on-device doesn't change the equation here. It changes the equation because it allows for everything leaving the device to be E2EE. One example is that this would stop anyone at Apple from snooping on your files. If the scanning was done on the server, Apple would need decrypted versions of the files which could be viewed by Apple employees.
  • least 5y ago
    > I don't want to get into a semantic debate about the word "actively". Suffice it to say that some people don't want to work on a product or support a company that they know is enabling criminal behavior while also refusing to do anything to curtail that illegal behavior. I already gave one example of something they could do to help curtail illegal behavior without requiring an invasion of privacy. Some people also don't want to support a company that they know is enabling surveillance, which is what Apple is doing here. > They are trying to do the scanning in a way that is invades privacy the least. A violation of your right to privacy is a violation no matter how small you might think it is. They don't need to invade our privacy at all. > It changes the equation because it allows for everything leaving the device to be E2EE. One example is that this would stop anyone at Apple from snooping on your files. If the scanning was done on the server, Apple would need decrypted versions of the files which could be viewed by Apple employees. Everything leaving the device isn't E2EE and this doesn't "allow" for everything leaving the device to be E2EE. Stop pushing this false dichotomy. Things can be E2EE without any invasion of privacy whatsoever and there are other options to help combat CSAM that aren't violations of a user's privacy. Stop pretending like this is the only option when it's clearly not.
    • slg 5y ago
      >I already gave one example of something they could do to help curtail illegal behavior without requiring an invasion of privacy. You said they should add a reporting mechanism, that won't stop anything because if a person already has knowledge that this content is being shared, they could just report it to the authorities. There is no reason to report it to Apple. Like you said, "Apple's role is not the police". >Some people also don't want to support a company that they know is enabling surveillance, which is what Apple is doing here. I acknowledged that in my first comment. Some people feel one way. Some people feel another. Apple is acknowledging both sides of this while you are only acknowledging one. >A violation of your right to privacy is a violation no matter how small you might think it is. They don't need to invade our privacy at all. This type of black and white ideology can't function in the real world. All rights have limits and the general rule is that your rights end when they start infringing on my rights. Your right to privacy does not supersede my right to not be a victim of a crime. >Everything leaving the device isn't E2EE and this doesn't "allow" for everything leaving the device to be E2EE. Stop pushing this false dichotomy. Everything I have seen from people in the know has suggested that this is a step on the path to Apple enabling E2EE encryption for iCloud. >Things can be E2EE without any invasion of privacy whatsoever and there are other options to help combat CSAM that aren't violations of a user's privacy. Stop pretending like this is the only option when it's clearly not. Do you have an actual suggestion that you think will cut down on CSAM beyond providing a redundant reporting system?
      • least 5y ago
        > You said they should add a reporting mechanism, that won't stop anything because if a person already has knowledge that this content is being shared, they could just report it to the authorities. There is no reason to report it to Apple. Like you said, "Apple's role is not the police". Recognition isn't something people would always be able to immediately do with CSAM imagery so Apple, which has already created a tool to recognize it, can assist with that. It can also create tools to reduce the overhead of reporting. If you make it easier to report, more people will do it. You're assuming that anyone that ever encounters CSAM would go out of their way to report it, which simply isn't true. > This type of black and white ideology can't function in the real world. All rights have limits and the general rule is that your rights end when they start infringing on my rights. Your right to privacy does not supersede my right to not be a victim of a crime. My right to privacy is not an infringement of your rights so this argument has no bearing in reality. Law enforcement requires probable cause to get permission to surveil the population and there's been countless cases thrown out because of this violation, which, as it turns out, was even tested in the context of technology interfacing with NCMEC. > Everything I have seen from people in the know has suggested that this is a step on the path to Apple enabling E2EE encryption for iCloud. Those people are also pushing the same false dichotomy that you are. There is no technical reason that this is required to enable E2EE for iCloud, it's purely speculation as to why Apple would roll this surveillance tool out, as a compromise to having a fully encrypted system. > Do you have an actual suggestion that you think will cut down on CSAM beyond providing a redundant reporting system? The reporting system isn't redundant, but beyond that, the impetus isn't on the person whose rights are being violated to offer solutions to replace that violation.