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>If they lack the capability to do so then they don't need to worry about it. "They don't need to worry about it" may be enough for you, but it is not a satisf

by slg 5y ago

>If they lack the capability to do so then they don't need to worry about it. "They don't need to worry about it" may be enough for you, but it is not a satisfactory moral answer for a lot of people. It shouldn't be tough to understand that some people don't want to actively enable illegal activity. >If you have a system in place that intercepts all files before they're encrypted and uploaded to the cloud, then E2EE doesn't serve its purpose of ensuring privacy of people's data. It completely defeats the point. Which is the reason why Apple proposed running this on the device so that those files don't leave the device if they aren't flagged.

least 5y ago
> "They don't need to worry about it" may be enough for you, but it is not a satisfactory moral answer for a lot of people. It shouldn't be tough to understand that some people don't want to actively enable illegal activity. You're not "actively" enabling illegal activity. The consequence of protecting people's rights is that illegal and immoral activity can occur under those same protections. It shouldn't be tough to understand that people don't want their rights trampled on to enable surveillance. > Which is the reason why Apple proposed running this on the device so that those files don't leave the device if they aren't flagged. How does this solve the issue, exactly? The fact that it's on-device doesn't change the equation here.
- deleted 5y ago
  [deleted]
- slg 5y ago
  >You're not "actively" enabling illegal activity. I don't want to get into a semantic debate about the word "actively". Suffice it to say that some people don't want to work on a product or support a company that they know is enabling criminal behavior while also refusing to do anything to curtail that illegal behavior. >It shouldn't be tough to understand that people don't want their rights trampled on to enable surveillance. Apple recognizes this. Once again, this is why they are doing this on device and not in the cloud like other providers. They are trying to do the scanning in a way that is invades privacy the least. >How does this solve the issue, exactly? The fact that it's on-device doesn't change the equation here. It changes the equation because it allows for everything leaving the device to be E2EE. One example is that this would stop anyone at Apple from snooping on your files. If the scanning was done on the server, Apple would need decrypted versions of the files which could be viewed by Apple employees.
  - least 5y ago
    > I don't want to get into a semantic debate about the word "actively". Suffice it to say that some people don't want to work on a product or support a company that they know is enabling criminal behavior while also refusing to do anything to curtail that illegal behavior. I already gave one example of something they could do to help curtail illegal behavior without requiring an invasion of privacy. Some people also don't want to support a company that they know is enabling surveillance, which is what Apple is doing here. > They are trying to do the scanning in a way that is invades privacy the least. A violation of your right to privacy is a violation no matter how small you might think it is. They don't need to invade our privacy at all. > It changes the equation because it allows for everything leaving the device to be E2EE. One example is that this would stop anyone at Apple from snooping on your files. If the scanning was done on the server, Apple would need decrypted versions of the files which could be viewed by Apple employees. Everything leaving the device isn't E2EE and this doesn't "allow" for everything leaving the device to be E2EE. Stop pushing this false dichotomy. Things can be E2EE without any invasion of privacy whatsoever and there are other options to help combat CSAM that aren't violations of a user's privacy. Stop pretending like this is the only option when it's clearly not.
    - slg 5y ago
      >I already gave one example of something they could do to help curtail illegal behavior without requiring an invasion of privacy. You said they should add a reporting mechanism, that won't stop anything because if a person already has knowledge that this content is being shared, they could just report it to the authorities. There is no reason to report it to Apple. Like you said, "Apple's role is not the police". >Some people also don't want to support a company that they know is enabling surveillance, which is what Apple is doing here. I acknowledged that in my first comment. Some people feel one way. Some people feel another. Apple is acknowledging both sides of this while you are only acknowledging one. >A violation of your right to privacy is a violation no matter how small you might think it is. They don't need to invade our privacy at all. This type of black and white ideology can't function in the real world. All rights have limits and the general rule is that your rights end when they start infringing on my rights. Your right to privacy does not supersede my right to not be a victim of a crime. >Everything leaving the device isn't E2EE and this doesn't "allow" for everything leaving the device to be E2EE. Stop pushing this false dichotomy. Everything I have seen from people in the know has suggested that this is a step on the path to Apple enabling E2EE encryption for iCloud. >Things can be E2EE without any invasion of privacy whatsoever and there are other options to help combat CSAM that aren't violations of a user's privacy. Stop pretending like this is the only option when it's clearly not. Do you have an actual suggestion that you think will cut down on CSAM beyond providing a redundant reporting system?

by slg 5y ago

least 5y ago

> "They don't need to worry about it" may be enough for you, but it is not a satisfactory moral answer for a lot of people. It shouldn't be tough to understand that some people don't want to actively enable illegal activity. You're not "actively" enabling illegal activity. The consequence of protecting people's rights is that illegal and immoral activity can occur under those same protections. It shouldn't be tough to understand that people don't want their rights trampled on to enable surveillance. > Which is the reason why Apple proposed running this on the device so that those files don't leave the device if they aren't flagged. How does this solve the issue, exactly? The fact that it's on-device doesn't change the equation here.

deleted 5y ago
[deleted]
slg 5y ago
>You're not "actively" enabling illegal activity. I don't want to get into a semantic debate about the word "actively". Suffice it to say that some people don't want to work on a product or support a company that they know is enabling criminal behavior while also refusing to do anything to curtail that illegal behavior. >It shouldn't be tough to understand that people don't want their rights trampled on to enable surveillance. Apple recognizes this. Once again, this is why they are doing this on device and not in the cloud like other providers. They are trying to do the scanning in a way that is invades privacy the least. >How does this solve the issue, exactly? The fact that it's on-device doesn't change the equation here. It changes the equation because it allows for everything leaving the device to be E2EE. One example is that this would stop anyone at Apple from snooping on your files. If the scanning was done on the server, Apple would need decrypted versions of the files which could be viewed by Apple employees.
- least 5y ago
  > I don't want to get into a semantic debate about the word "actively". Suffice it to say that some people don't want to work on a product or support a company that they know is enabling criminal behavior while also refusing to do anything to curtail that illegal behavior. I already gave one example of something they could do to help curtail illegal behavior without requiring an invasion of privacy. Some people also don't want to support a company that they know is enabling surveillance, which is what Apple is doing here. > They are trying to do the scanning in a way that is invades privacy the least. A violation of your right to privacy is a violation no matter how small you might think it is. They don't need to invade our privacy at all. > It changes the equation because it allows for everything leaving the device to be E2EE. One example is that this would stop anyone at Apple from snooping on your files. If the scanning was done on the server, Apple would need decrypted versions of the files which could be viewed by Apple employees. Everything leaving the device isn't E2EE and this doesn't "allow" for everything leaving the device to be E2EE. Stop pushing this false dichotomy. Things can be E2EE without any invasion of privacy whatsoever and there are other options to help combat CSAM that aren't violations of a user's privacy. Stop pretending like this is the only option when it's clearly not.
  - slg 5y ago
    >I already gave one example of something they could do to help curtail illegal behavior without requiring an invasion of privacy. You said they should add a reporting mechanism, that won't stop anything because if a person already has knowledge that this content is being shared, they could just report it to the authorities. There is no reason to report it to Apple. Like you said, "Apple's role is not the police". >Some people also don't want to support a company that they know is enabling surveillance, which is what Apple is doing here. I acknowledged that in my first comment. Some people feel one way. Some people feel another. Apple is acknowledging both sides of this while you are only acknowledging one. >A violation of your right to privacy is a violation no matter how small you might think it is. They don't need to invade our privacy at all. This type of black and white ideology can't function in the real world. All rights have limits and the general rule is that your rights end when they start infringing on my rights. Your right to privacy does not supersede my right to not be a victim of a crime. >Everything leaving the device isn't E2EE and this doesn't "allow" for everything leaving the device to be E2EE. Stop pushing this false dichotomy. Everything I have seen from people in the know has suggested that this is a step on the path to Apple enabling E2EE encryption for iCloud. >Things can be E2EE without any invasion of privacy whatsoever and there are other options to help combat CSAM that aren't violations of a user's privacy. Stop pretending like this is the only option when it's clearly not. Do you have an actual suggestion that you think will cut down on CSAM beyond providing a redundant reporting system?