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> What if the police come to Apple with a warrant? Should Apple have the responsibility to reveal the user's content to authorities? If they lack the capabilit

by least 5y ago

> What if the police come to Apple with a warrant? Should Apple have the responsibility to reveal the user's content to authorities? If they lack the capability to do so then they don't need to worry about it. > Part of the motivation for this type of thing is that E2EE effectively makes the old system of warrants obsolete and hides this data permanently from authorities. Lots of people see that as a huge win. Lots of people see that as a huge loss. The speculation that this enables E2EE is just that; speculation. It's also not a strong argument because Apple could implement E2EE without snooping people's photographs and they'd be in the same position of being unable to assist law enforcement. If you have a system in place that intercepts all files before they're encrypted and uploaded to the cloud, then E2EE doesn't serve its purpose of ensuring privacy of people's data. It completely defeats the point.

slg 5y ago
>If they lack the capability to do so then they don't need to worry about it. "They don't need to worry about it" may be enough for you, but it is not a satisfactory moral answer for a lot of people. It shouldn't be tough to understand that some people don't want to actively enable illegal activity. >If you have a system in place that intercepts all files before they're encrypted and uploaded to the cloud, then E2EE doesn't serve its purpose of ensuring privacy of people's data. It completely defeats the point. Which is the reason why Apple proposed running this on the device so that those files don't leave the device if they aren't flagged.
- least 5y ago
  > "They don't need to worry about it" may be enough for you, but it is not a satisfactory moral answer for a lot of people. It shouldn't be tough to understand that some people don't want to actively enable illegal activity. You're not "actively" enabling illegal activity. The consequence of protecting people's rights is that illegal and immoral activity can occur under those same protections. It shouldn't be tough to understand that people don't want their rights trampled on to enable surveillance. > Which is the reason why Apple proposed running this on the device so that those files don't leave the device if they aren't flagged. How does this solve the issue, exactly? The fact that it's on-device doesn't change the equation here.
  - deleted 5y ago
    [deleted]
  - slg 5y ago
    >You're not "actively" enabling illegal activity. I don't want to get into a semantic debate about the word "actively". Suffice it to say that some people don't want to work on a product or support a company that they know is enabling criminal behavior while also refusing to do anything to curtail that illegal behavior. >It shouldn't be tough to understand that people don't want their rights trampled on to enable surveillance. Apple recognizes this. Once again, this is why they are doing this on device and not in the cloud like other providers. They are trying to do the scanning in a way that is invades privacy the least. >How does this solve the issue, exactly? The fact that it's on-device doesn't change the equation here. It changes the equation because it allows for everything leaving the device to be E2EE. One example is that this would stop anyone at Apple from snooping on your files. If the scanning was done on the server, Apple would need decrypted versions of the files which could be viewed by Apple employees.
    - least 5y ago
      > I don't want to get into a semantic debate about the word "actively". Suffice it to say that some people don't want to work on a product or support a company that they know is enabling criminal behavior while also refusing to do anything to curtail that illegal behavior. I already gave one example of something they could do to help curtail illegal behavior without requiring an invasion of privacy. Some people also don't want to support a company that they know is enabling surveillance, which is what Apple is doing here. > They are trying to do the scanning in a way that is invades privacy the least. A violation of your right to privacy is a violation no matter how small you might think it is. They don't need to invade our privacy at all. > It changes the equation because it allows for everything leaving the device to be E2EE. One example is that this would stop anyone at Apple from snooping on your files. If the scanning was done on the server, Apple would need decrypted versions of the files which could be viewed by Apple employees. Everything leaving the device isn't E2EE and this doesn't "allow" for everything leaving the device to be E2EE. Stop pushing this false dichotomy. Things can be E2EE without any invasion of privacy whatsoever and there are other options to help combat CSAM that aren't violations of a user's privacy. Stop pretending like this is the only option when it's clearly not.
nonbirithm 5y ago
They will absolutely have to worry about it when Apple is declared a safe haven for child abusers and the government declares they have criminal liability. In my mind, what might have actually transpired for Apple to announce this change was a less severe instance of such governmental or legal pressure on Apple to scan as much data as the other major tech companies. Last year Apple only submitted a couple hundred reports to the NCMEC, while Facebook submitted 20 million. Looking at those numbers makes it sound like Apple was a nail sticking out that needed to be hammered down.

by least 5y ago

slg 5y ago

>If they lack the capability to do so then they don't need to worry about it. "They don't need to worry about it" may be enough for you, but it is not a satisfactory moral answer for a lot of people. It shouldn't be tough to understand that some people don't want to actively enable illegal activity. >If you have a system in place that intercepts all files before they're encrypted and uploaded to the cloud, then E2EE doesn't serve its purpose of ensuring privacy of people's data. It completely defeats the point. Which is the reason why Apple proposed running this on the device so that those files don't leave the device if they aren't flagged.

least 5y ago
> "They don't need to worry about it" may be enough for you, but it is not a satisfactory moral answer for a lot of people. It shouldn't be tough to understand that some people don't want to actively enable illegal activity. You're not "actively" enabling illegal activity. The consequence of protecting people's rights is that illegal and immoral activity can occur under those same protections. It shouldn't be tough to understand that people don't want their rights trampled on to enable surveillance. > Which is the reason why Apple proposed running this on the device so that those files don't leave the device if they aren't flagged. How does this solve the issue, exactly? The fact that it's on-device doesn't change the equation here.
- deleted 5y ago
  [deleted]
- slg 5y ago
  >You're not "actively" enabling illegal activity. I don't want to get into a semantic debate about the word "actively". Suffice it to say that some people don't want to work on a product or support a company that they know is enabling criminal behavior while also refusing to do anything to curtail that illegal behavior. >It shouldn't be tough to understand that people don't want their rights trampled on to enable surveillance. Apple recognizes this. Once again, this is why they are doing this on device and not in the cloud like other providers. They are trying to do the scanning in a way that is invades privacy the least. >How does this solve the issue, exactly? The fact that it's on-device doesn't change the equation here. It changes the equation because it allows for everything leaving the device to be E2EE. One example is that this would stop anyone at Apple from snooping on your files. If the scanning was done on the server, Apple would need decrypted versions of the files which could be viewed by Apple employees.
  - least 5y ago
    > I don't want to get into a semantic debate about the word "actively". Suffice it to say that some people don't want to work on a product or support a company that they know is enabling criminal behavior while also refusing to do anything to curtail that illegal behavior. I already gave one example of something they could do to help curtail illegal behavior without requiring an invasion of privacy. Some people also don't want to support a company that they know is enabling surveillance, which is what Apple is doing here. > They are trying to do the scanning in a way that is invades privacy the least. A violation of your right to privacy is a violation no matter how small you might think it is. They don't need to invade our privacy at all. > It changes the equation because it allows for everything leaving the device to be E2EE. One example is that this would stop anyone at Apple from snooping on your files. If the scanning was done on the server, Apple would need decrypted versions of the files which could be viewed by Apple employees. Everything leaving the device isn't E2EE and this doesn't "allow" for everything leaving the device to be E2EE. Stop pushing this false dichotomy. Things can be E2EE without any invasion of privacy whatsoever and there are other options to help combat CSAM that aren't violations of a user's privacy. Stop pretending like this is the only option when it's clearly not.

nonbirithm 5y ago

They will absolutely have to worry about it when Apple is declared a safe haven for child abusers and the government declares they have criminal liability. In my mind, what might have actually transpired for Apple to announce this change was a less severe instance of such governmental or legal pressure on Apple to scan as much data as the other major tech companies. Last year Apple only submitted a couple hundred reports to the NCMEC, while Facebook submitted 20 million. Looking at those numbers makes it sound like Apple was a nail sticking out that needed to be hammered down.