7 ms·

No, they shouldn't scan data. Apple's role is not the police and they don't have the responsibility or moral imperative to scan for illegal imagery on their cus

by least 5y ago

No, they shouldn't scan data. Apple's role is not the police and they don't have the responsibility or moral imperative to scan for illegal imagery on their customers' phones. In fact it's the opposite. They should be in service to their customers and people's devices especially should be in service to its owner. On-device scanning violates this premise. There are things you can use technology for to help combat CSAM, but this is certainly not an acceptable way to go about it. Creating tools to help report abuse and illegal imagery in their software, for example, could be useful. This is not.

slg 5y ago
>Apple's role is not the police and they don't have the responsibility or moral imperative to scan for illegal imagery on their customers' phones What if the police come to Apple with a warrant? Should Apple have the responsibility to reveal the user's content to authorities? Part of the motivation for this type of thing is that E2EE effectively makes the old system of warrants obsolete and hides this data permanently from authorities. Lots of people see that as a huge win. Lots of people see that as a huge loss.
- least 5y ago
  > What if the police come to Apple with a warrant? Should Apple have the responsibility to reveal the user's content to authorities? If they lack the capability to do so then they don't need to worry about it. > Part of the motivation for this type of thing is that E2EE effectively makes the old system of warrants obsolete and hides this data permanently from authorities. Lots of people see that as a huge win. Lots of people see that as a huge loss. The speculation that this enables E2EE is just that; speculation. It's also not a strong argument because Apple could implement E2EE without snooping people's photographs and they'd be in the same position of being unable to assist law enforcement. If you have a system in place that intercepts all files before they're encrypted and uploaded to the cloud, then E2EE doesn't serve its purpose of ensuring privacy of people's data. It completely defeats the point.
  - slg 5y ago
    >If they lack the capability to do so then they don't need to worry about it. "They don't need to worry about it" may be enough for you, but it is not a satisfactory moral answer for a lot of people. It shouldn't be tough to understand that some people don't want to actively enable illegal activity. >If you have a system in place that intercepts all files before they're encrypted and uploaded to the cloud, then E2EE doesn't serve its purpose of ensuring privacy of people's data. It completely defeats the point. Which is the reason why Apple proposed running this on the device so that those files don't leave the device if they aren't flagged.
    - least 5y ago
      > "They don't need to worry about it" may be enough for you, but it is not a satisfactory moral answer for a lot of people. It shouldn't be tough to understand that some people don't want to actively enable illegal activity. You're not "actively" enabling illegal activity. The consequence of protecting people's rights is that illegal and immoral activity can occur under those same protections. It shouldn't be tough to understand that people don't want their rights trampled on to enable surveillance. > Which is the reason why Apple proposed running this on the device so that those files don't leave the device if they aren't flagged. How does this solve the issue, exactly? The fact that it's on-device doesn't change the equation here.
      - deleted 5y ago
        [deleted]
      - slg 5y ago
        >You're not "actively" enabling illegal activity. I don't want to get into a semantic debate about the word "actively". Suffice it to say that some people don't want to work on a product or support a company that they know is enabling criminal behavior while also refusing to do anything to curtail that illegal behavior. >It shouldn't be tough to understand that people don't want their rights trampled on to enable surveillance. Apple recognizes this. Once again, this is why they are doing this on device and not in the cloud like other providers. They are trying to do the scanning in a way that is invades privacy the least. >How does this solve the issue, exactly? The fact that it's on-device doesn't change the equation here. It changes the equation because it allows for everything leaving the device to be E2EE. One example is that this would stop anyone at Apple from snooping on your files. If the scanning was done on the server, Apple would need decrypted versions of the files which could be viewed by Apple employees.
- Koffiepoeder 5y ago
  To be honest, no. The police should come to you with a warrant. I understand that in exceptional cases of advanced crime an elaborate case should be built, but for the average joe these collusive investigation tactics are overkill and, quite frankly, a form of power abuse.
  - slg 5y ago
    >The police should come to you with a warrant. How does that change the warrant's effectiveness? Should you be obligated to unlock your phone for authorities? Otherwise the warrant still does nothing because the device's encryption can't be broken without forcing a person to potentially self-incriminate themselves. This is fundamentally the same problem that encryption breaks how warrants used to behave.

by least 5y ago

slg 5y ago

>Apple's role is not the police and they don't have the responsibility or moral imperative to scan for illegal imagery on their customers' phones What if the police come to Apple with a warrant? Should Apple have the responsibility to reveal the user's content to authorities? Part of the motivation for this type of thing is that E2EE effectively makes the old system of warrants obsolete and hides this data permanently from authorities. Lots of people see that as a huge win. Lots of people see that as a huge loss.

least 5y ago
> What if the police come to Apple with a warrant? Should Apple have the responsibility to reveal the user's content to authorities? If they lack the capability to do so then they don't need to worry about it. > Part of the motivation for this type of thing is that E2EE effectively makes the old system of warrants obsolete and hides this data permanently from authorities. Lots of people see that as a huge win. Lots of people see that as a huge loss. The speculation that this enables E2EE is just that; speculation. It's also not a strong argument because Apple could implement E2EE without snooping people's photographs and they'd be in the same position of being unable to assist law enforcement. If you have a system in place that intercepts all files before they're encrypted and uploaded to the cloud, then E2EE doesn't serve its purpose of ensuring privacy of people's data. It completely defeats the point.
- slg 5y ago
  >If they lack the capability to do so then they don't need to worry about it. "They don't need to worry about it" may be enough for you, but it is not a satisfactory moral answer for a lot of people. It shouldn't be tough to understand that some people don't want to actively enable illegal activity. >If you have a system in place that intercepts all files before they're encrypted and uploaded to the cloud, then E2EE doesn't serve its purpose of ensuring privacy of people's data. It completely defeats the point. Which is the reason why Apple proposed running this on the device so that those files don't leave the device if they aren't flagged.
  - least 5y ago
    > "They don't need to worry about it" may be enough for you, but it is not a satisfactory moral answer for a lot of people. It shouldn't be tough to understand that some people don't want to actively enable illegal activity. You're not "actively" enabling illegal activity. The consequence of protecting people's rights is that illegal and immoral activity can occur under those same protections. It shouldn't be tough to understand that people don't want their rights trampled on to enable surveillance. > Which is the reason why Apple proposed running this on the device so that those files don't leave the device if they aren't flagged. How does this solve the issue, exactly? The fact that it's on-device doesn't change the equation here.
    - deleted 5y ago
      [deleted]
    - slg 5y ago
      >You're not "actively" enabling illegal activity. I don't want to get into a semantic debate about the word "actively". Suffice it to say that some people don't want to work on a product or support a company that they know is enabling criminal behavior while also refusing to do anything to curtail that illegal behavior. >It shouldn't be tough to understand that people don't want their rights trampled on to enable surveillance. Apple recognizes this. Once again, this is why they are doing this on device and not in the cloud like other providers. They are trying to do the scanning in a way that is invades privacy the least. >How does this solve the issue, exactly? The fact that it's on-device doesn't change the equation here. It changes the equation because it allows for everything leaving the device to be E2EE. One example is that this would stop anyone at Apple from snooping on your files. If the scanning was done on the server, Apple would need decrypted versions of the files which could be viewed by Apple employees.
Koffiepoeder 5y ago
To be honest, no. The police should come to you with a warrant. I understand that in exceptional cases of advanced crime an elaborate case should be built, but for the average joe these collusive investigation tactics are overkill and, quite frankly, a form of power abuse.
- slg 5y ago
  >The police should come to you with a warrant. How does that change the warrant's effectiveness? Should you be obligated to unlock your phone for authorities? Otherwise the warrant still does nothing because the device's encryption can't be broken without forcing a person to potentially self-incriminate themselves. This is fundamentally the same problem that encryption breaks how warrants used to behave.