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Now let's create one for the hash matching that Google, Microsoft, and other cloud providers use. If your problem with Apple's proposal is the fact they do has

• mulmen 5y ago
  The backlash is because Apple differentiates on privacy. Users are understandably upset that Apple went back on their word and no longer puts user privacy first.
  • slg 5y ago
    Does that mean we shouldn't hold companies accountable for violating privacy as long as they don't market themselves as being pro-privacy?
    • wmf 5y ago
      Honestly, if we want a higher baseline of privacy (or environmental protection, or worker rights, etc.) we need laws not public pressure.
  • kristjansson 5y ago
    This _is_ a user privacy feature. It's clearly a precursor to E2EE iCloud services they weren't able to provide before.
    • mulmen 5y ago
      I fail to see how scanning my photos on my device is a win for privacy. What’s the point of E2E encryption if there’s access to the device? E2EE is meaningless in the presence of this backdoor.
      • kristjansson 5y ago
        The CSAM scanning system Apple describes prevents[0] the sort of abuse that has historically been used as as argument against convenient strong encryption. By casting a very specific net for the most egregious abuse, they defuse the strongest political argument against E2EE while remaining compatible with a strong E2EE system. Read the docs upthread - they go to lengths to cryptographically enforce the topline privacy guarantees. Client side scanning of iCloud-destined photos is a net-zero change, since they’re already doing this server side. Scanning plus future E2EE is a strict improvement in privacy for iCloud users. If you're concerned about ways Apple might access on-device contents in the future ... there's myriad ways for your OS vendor to circumvent the privacy protections offered by your OS ... [0] or is at least as comprehensive a mitigation as possible on systems with access to cleartext
        • deleted 5y ago
          [deleted]
• spoiler 5y ago
  I think people are harsher over the intent more than the the hashing algorithm being used (it does exacerbate the problem, though)?
  • slg 5y ago
    Yes, that is the reason behind my comment. The linked site is not criticizing the intent. It is criticizing the hashing algorithm. Therefore this post either shouldn't be part of the criticism of Apple's plan or it should be part of the overall criticism of the tech industry including Google and Microsoft. I don't think the hashing exacerbates the problem because the alternative to Apple's proposal seems like it would be to run the same hash matching on the server like those other companies. That doesn't fix the hash collision problem.
  • nonbirithm 5y ago
    The intent is supposed to be the same as with the usage of PhotoDNA. If anything, this is proof that security by obscurity is an effective strategy not only for hiding activity in a black box, but also preventing potential protesters from ever becoming aware that there was a problem to begin with. I completely agree that the magnitude of the backlash against Apple is not fair in comparison to the backlash against every other tech company using PhotoDNA, and it feels hypocritical to for everyone to have given them a pass for over a decade despite the principle and intent remaining the same.
    • nullc 5y ago
      Having a device you own scan your files and report you is fundamentally different from having a server which you submitted plaintext files to search you. I agree both are bad, but Apple's scheme erodes a critical boundary. It would be like if the bank searched your safe deposit box stored in their vault in the course of their business, but then later announced that to reduce the need to search your vault they'd be stationing a spy in your home to inspect the box before you leave for the bank. The spy will secretly report back to the bank if he sees something he suspects, and then the bank will search. With these collision examples, you now learn that the spy will also be tripping balls.