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(A threshold of) matchings result in the private keys for the images being leaked to Apple, where they're vulnerable to: (1) Review by apple staff (2) Access a
by nullc 5y ago
(A threshold of) matchings result in the private keys for the images being leaked to Apple, where they're vulnerable to:
(1) Review by apple staff
(2) Access and leaking by other apple staff
(3) Access by hackers who have compromised their system
(4) Access by parties coercing apple/staff, including via national security letters.
All of which compromise the privacy of the user. This matters or the neuralhash comparison wouldn't exist in the first place.
Totally agree that the whole system is grotesque-- but that doesn't stop it also being grotesque in every detail as well. The fact that there are false positives when they easily could have designed a system that had none (at the expense of increased false negatives) shows that Apple doesn't especially value customer privacy even if you accept their vigilante privacy invasion. The fact that it's possible to construct adversarial false positives and that their reports didn't disclose this fact shows they either don't know what they're doing or they're not being honest about the risks (or both).