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Perceptual hashes are only used to reduce the search space for human review. Apple doesn’t have images in the CSAM database to do a comparison, but if it’s jus
by Retric 5y ago
Perceptual hashes are only used to reduce the search space for human review. Apple doesn’t have images in the CSAM database to do a comparison, but if it’s just a picture of a door their going to reject it. Also, because human review is an expense Apple’s incentives are to minimize the number of times it happens, thus the requirement for multiple collisions.
- jdavis703 5y ago> Apple’s incentives are to minimize the number of times it happens, thus the requirement for multiple collisions. How can we be sure they won’t cut costs by increasing worker load? I could see them giving each reviewer less time to review individual pictures before passing it on to law enforcement.
- fraa-orolo 5y agoWe can't and they probably will, everyone else seems to already be doing so. There's that Swiss federal police report that only about 10% of NCMEC reports are actually relevant (https://fedpol.report/en/fedpol-in-figures/fight-against-paedophile-crime https://fedpol.report/en/fedpol-in-figures/fight-against-pae...)
- Tagbert 5y agoIf they pass false positives to authorities that will open them up to legal action.
- deleted 5y ago[deleted]
- wyager 5y agoEdit: I incorrectly claimed there wasn’t manual review - see below
- xadhominemx 5y agoWhat is the basis for your understanding?
- wyager 5y agoApologies, I was mistaken: “ Only when the threshold is exceeded does the cryptographic technology allow Apple to interpret the contents of the safety vouchers associated with the matching CSAM images. Apple then manually reviews each report to confirm there is a match” The design goal was no human review for individual matches.
- zionic 5y agoApple's human review is largely useless. Trolls will be able to easily use tools slightly modify ambiguous adult porn to collide with a "known CP hash". A human reviewer will see a blurry grayscale derivative of adult pornographic content and hit "report" every time.
- at_a_remove 5y agoThis is the threat model I am looking at. It is number one with a bullet. We have already had a court case where an adult actress had to show up in court and prove that she was adult when experts testified that the images were of a non-adult woman. Baby in the sink? No. But a bunch of the aforementioned? Yeah.
- woofie11 5y agoI don't really want my family photos reviewed by strangers. "Reducing the search space" of photos on my phone isn't an outcome I want to live with. At the time someone is looking at photos of my, my wife/husband/girlfriend/boyfriend, and my kids, they'd better have a darned good reason (e.g. a search warrant). I'd also appreciate if Apple let me know if my false positives were reviewed and found to not be CASM.
- sroussey 5y agoDon’t upload an image anywhere, else it can be reviewed.
- woofie11 5y agoThe whole point of Apple's system is that I don't need to upload an image anywhere. Images from my phone can be stolen and reviewed with no due process, based on proprietary Apple technology.
- partdavid 5y agoThe system as described only submits its safety vouchers when photos are uploaded to iCloud. Not saying it will stay that way, but there are three distinct realms of objection to this system, and it's probably useful to separate them: 1. Objections that in the future, something different will happen with the technology, system, or companies; so that even if the system is unobjectionable now, we should object because of what it might be used for in the future; or how it might change. 2. Objections that Apple can't be trusted to do what they say they are doing, so that even if they say they will only refer cases after careful manual review, or that they will submit images for review that were not uploaded to iCloud, we can't believe them, so we should object. 3. Objections that hold for the system as designed and promised; in other words, even if all the actors do what they say they are doing in good faith and this monitoring never expands, it's still bad. People who have the third kind of objection need to deal with the fact that Apple is basically putting in a system with more careful safeguards than are already in place in many Internet services, even for their "private" media storage or exchange. You likely don't know how the services you use are scanning for CSAM but if the service is at all sizeable (chat, mail, cloud storage) it's likely using PhotoDNA or something similar. I think there are valid objections on all three bases. But there's a difference in saying "this is bad because of something that might happen" and "this is bad because of what is actually happening".
- nullc 5y ago> Perceptual hashes are only used to reduce the search space for human review. False. The Apple proposed system leaks the cryptographic keys needed to decode the images conditional on the match (threshold of matches) of the faulty neuralhash perceptual hash. Matching these hashes results in otherwise encrypted highly confidential data being decodable by apple, accessable on their servers to the relevant staff along with anyone who compromises them or coerces them.
- Retric 5y agoApple can decode the data either way. Their the ones doing the encryption on their servers. There are two basic reasons for this first it’s a backup service which makes end to end encryption risky, but second they also let users share access to their baked up photos. iCloud > photos > shared album.