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> If you don't, I suggest to ban them at your gateways. Can't you get the same security benefit, but without the drawback of being totally unable to reach such
by josephcsible 5y ago
> If you don't, I suggest to ban them at your gateways.
Can't you get the same security benefit, but without the drawback of being totally unable to reach such sites, just by disabling network.IDN_show_punycode in about:config (or some equivalent if you're not using Firefox)?
- noasaservice 5y agoIf the browsers were the only thing affected, you'd be completely right. But the truth is that browsers are only a part of the issue here. We have to deal with: WWW browsers (firefox, chrome, edge, ie, brave, "browser" etc) email clients (LOTS) Signal Twitter Discord Google hangouts Telegram FB messenger And many more. And most of those don't have disambiguation settings like your example with firefox does. And all of them should be guarded against, as they have the same failure modes of "being sent link to log into $fake_service and looking completely real and getting hacked". I still maintain, since unicode provides no protections against homoglyphs, that the only real answer here is to firstly expand them to punycode, and secondarily to remove all homoglyph text.
- thaumasiotes 5y agoWell, there are two common attack types based on punycode. Type 1 is that you stick a homograph in there and hope it gets rendered and the victim never notices the difference. Type 2 is that you create a punycode URL which makes no sense by any standard, but which looks like xn--something-microsoft.com, and then you hope the punycode doesn't get rendered and your victim only notices the part where it ends with microsoft.com .
- josephcsible 5y agoFor type 2, doesn't that attack work just as well even if it doesn't start with xn--?
- thaumasiotes 5y agoYes. But the fact that people try to do this with punycode URLs is relevant when you're deciding whether or not to block all punycode URLs. It adds a minor benefit to the "block" column.