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Per ATP: Apple will compare hashes of local photos with a national registry of child pornography photos. Once a certain (unknown) threshold is reached, let's sa

Per ATP: Apple will compare hashes of local photos with a national registry of child pornography photos. Once a certain (unknown) threshold is reached, let's say 20 hits, some kind of escalation occurs, with some kind of manual (human) review steps. Accidental Tech Podcast - A Storm of Asterisks https://atp.fm/443 https://atp.fm/443 I haven't listened to the follow up episode yet. I still have zero opinion on this photo scanning kerfuffle. I just don't know enough. Of all the "hot takes" on this issue, ATP's has been the most comprehensive. So appreciated.

pbronez 5y ago
Thanks for the link. Daring Fireball’s analysis is the most helpful take I’ve seen on the topic so far: https://daringfireball.net/2021/08/apple_child_safety_initiatives_slippery_slope https://daringfireball.net/2021/08/apple_child_safety_initia...
hackinthebochs 5y ago
I'm interested in the details of the manual review. Does Apple have access to the database of original images and will they use it compare? If not, I can imagine a scenario where a photo of a naked child is flagged as matching the database, the human reviewer sees that it is in fact a naked child and assumes this must mean the image has been legally determined to be child pornography. The case gets referred to authorities and the innocent victim's life is upended for potentially years until the case plays out.
- snowwrestler 5y ago
  Law enforcement must manually review all suspected CSAM before seeking a warrant based on it. There is a whole process there, beyond whatever Apple has implemented, before a prosecution begins. Understand that matching a file in the NCMEC database is not itself a crime. The whole CSAM-detecting ecosystem is just a tool for surfacing potential crimes. Having a few pics of your own child naked is not illegal and it’s pretty easy for law enforcement to figure out if that’s the case.
  - hackinthebochs 5y ago
    >Law enforcement must manually review all suspected CSAM before seeking a warrant based on it. Is this a legal statute or simply convention due to the ways things have historically worked (i.e. pre-hash matching at scale)? If warrants are granted based on probable cause, it seems easy to convince a judge that a hash match is sufficiently unlikely that it would exceed the threshold for probable cause. In the context of cryptographic hashes, this is accurate. But if law enforcement doesn't distinguish between cryptographic and perceptual hashes, then there is the real possibility for cases opened and warrants issued unjustifiably. Sure, matching a hash isn't a crime and you will eventually be exonerated. But as they say, you can beat the rap but you can't beat the ride.
    - mulmen 5y ago
      > Sure, matching a hash isn't a crime and you will eventually be exonerated. s/will/might/
scotty79 5y ago
So there's a national database of all child pornography that Apple has access to? How is that access legal?

pbronez 5y ago

Thanks for the link. Daring Fireball’s analysis is the most helpful take I’ve seen on the topic so far: https://daringfireball.net/2021/08/apple_child_safety_initiatives_slippery_slope https://daringfireball.net/2021/08/apple_child_safety_initia...

hackinthebochs 5y ago

I'm interested in the details of the manual review. Does Apple have access to the database of original images and will they use it compare? If not, I can imagine a scenario where a photo of a naked child is flagged as matching the database, the human reviewer sees that it is in fact a naked child and assumes this must mean the image has been legally determined to be child pornography. The case gets referred to authorities and the innocent victim's life is upended for potentially years until the case plays out.

snowwrestler 5y ago
Law enforcement must manually review all suspected CSAM before seeking a warrant based on it. There is a whole process there, beyond whatever Apple has implemented, before a prosecution begins. Understand that matching a file in the NCMEC database is not itself a crime. The whole CSAM-detecting ecosystem is just a tool for surfacing potential crimes. Having a few pics of your own child naked is not illegal and it’s pretty easy for law enforcement to figure out if that’s the case.
- hackinthebochs 5y ago
  >Law enforcement must manually review all suspected CSAM before seeking a warrant based on it. Is this a legal statute or simply convention due to the ways things have historically worked (i.e. pre-hash matching at scale)? If warrants are granted based on probable cause, it seems easy to convince a judge that a hash match is sufficiently unlikely that it would exceed the threshold for probable cause. In the context of cryptographic hashes, this is accurate. But if law enforcement doesn't distinguish between cryptographic and perceptual hashes, then there is the real possibility for cases opened and warrants issued unjustifiably. Sure, matching a hash isn't a crime and you will eventually be exonerated. But as they say, you can beat the rap but you can't beat the ride.
  - mulmen 5y ago
    > Sure, matching a hash isn't a crime and you will eventually be exonerated. s/will/might/

scotty79 5y ago

So there's a national database of all child pornography that Apple has access to? How is that access legal?