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> Anything you tumble, you can (provably) de-tumble. Source? Enough CoinJoins (Wasabi+Joinmarket) and I don’t think so. Note CJ work a bit different than the o
by 3np 5y ago
> Anything you tumble, you can (provably) de-tumble.
Source? Enough CoinJoins (Wasabi+Joinmarket) and I don’t think so. Note CJ work a bit different than the oldschool custodial tumblers. Combining CJs with LN (reverse) submarine swap for another layer.
With large enough anyonymity sets you should have plausible deniability. This is also a bit time-consuming, more so the larger the amount; there’s no way to do a complete end-to-end transaction of billions of dollars untracably in mere hours without standing out I think. But if you have days/weeks to break the link I think it’s def doable and done.
Obviously make one single mistake and you’re out, but that’s in the nature of these things.
If I’m wrong I’d very much appreciate something substantial.
- dmitriy_ko 5y agoRight, and it doesn't even require actual tumblers. Any service where you can deposit and then withdraw bitcoin can be used as a tumbler: gambling sites, exchanges, bitcoin marketplaces etc. Each time this is done the link is broken, and to de-tumble you need transaction history from each of those services. It's like if you want to deanonymize someone who connects to Internet though 10 VPNs: you need logs for ALL 10 VPNs to deanonymize the user. Criminals can also exchange bitcoin to Monero through anonymous exchanges, let it sit for a while and then exchange back over time.