4 ms·

The killer app of centralized chat systems is their general protections against unwelcome abusive contact from strangers (spam, harassment, death threats). Ever

The killer app of centralized chat systems is their general protections against unwelcome abusive contact from strangers (spam, harassment, death threats). Everyone focuses on the protocol but I focus on the experience, what with having been stalked for twenty years by an Internet-competent stalker. So I see nothing in this Modern XMPP website that is competitive on that point, which means I'll likely continue ignoring XMPP, same as I do IRC these days. Is there something I've missed that Modern XMPP implements that protects against abusers?

mst 5y ago
Do you mean forced non-anomymity to the provider so every time you block them they need a new phone number to contact you again? Figuring out the right combination of G-lines to get some bastard to stay out on IRC is a bit trickier, certainly, but I'm sufficiently stubborn that even the worst of the harassers I've been chasing down for users have given up before I have.
- floatingatoll 5y ago
  I don't know if what you describe is the answer, but certainly I mean "someone is implementing anti-attacker processes upon new signups and existing accounts", so that the majority of abusive attacks are stopped before I'm required to Block someone. As you describe with G-lines, without a centralized anti-attacker system, it is very much the whack-a-mole game that I'm accustomed to from XMPP or IRC.
  - mst 5y ago
    I sort of wish we had an effective way to say e.g. "no DMs from account that isn't <this> verified" on less centralised systems - the "no DMs from unregistered users" switch on some ircds being the most primitive possible gesture in such a direction. I imagine you'd want to turn that dial rather higher than I would, and with good reason, but having a dial at all seems like a good way to avoid a whole bunch of other potential problems. (though "if this was going to happen it probably already would have" is likely a good argument for not holding one's breath)
  - southerntofu 5y ago
    > without a centralized anti-attacker system, it is very much the whack-a-mole game Unfortunately, even centralized networks play this whack-a-mole game. Facebook/Google requesting ID cards or phone number has unfortunately not eliminated abuse from their network. Which is not to say there's no way we can improve the situation (see my other comment).
    - floatingatoll 5y ago
      Your statement is incomplete, and presents only the framing "abuse was not eliminated", as if eliminating abuse were a boolean Y/N flag and therefore all steps taken to date are a total failure. The two centralized networks you referenced have eliminated some abuse from their network by taking those steps. As I said elsethread, I won't try to persuade you that it's right for them to have taken steps, but I'm certain we still both agree that it's impossible to completely eliminate abuse from any system containing user-generated content, and therefore the metric of success you set ("eliminated") is provably unattainable, which does^ invalidate your framing. ^ (unless you think it's possible to fully eliminate abuse, in which case you have a trillion dollar startup idea to pursue, because we all sure need that!)
      - southerntofu 5y ago
        > The two centralized networks you referenced have eliminated some abuse from their network by taking those steps. That is true, but at the same time they have also eliminated many legitimate users and placed remaining users in dangerous situations by requesting more personal information that can and will be leaked and will be used again them. Also, their anti-abuse model relies exclusively on the benevolence of law enforcement: that's why they collect more information in order to cooperate with law enforcement. However in most (all?) parts of the world law enforcement is neither concerned with protecting people, especially victims of cyber-harassment and misogynistic violence. Internally, Facebook and such platforms usually combat violent (as in, blood is visible) and "indecent" (a woman breastfeeding in a photo, what a scandal) content but not hateful fascist/masculinist propaganda. It usually takes a massive media scandal for such platforms to close down well-known groups coordinating harassment/doxxing campaigns. From my personal and political perspective as a politically-active non-binary person, that tradeoff is not worth it. But i can understand and respect if your perspective on the matter is different. > unless you think it's possible to fully eliminate abuse I don't think it's possible to fully eliminate abuse ever, whether in cyberspace or in the physical space. We can however, develop collective processes and reflexes in order to strongly mitigate the harm done by people attempting abuse. From a protocol's perspective, reputation systems and WoTs are not hard to specify. The real problem that has not truly been explored yet is how to develop a good UI/UX for this pattern, where the user can turn many knobs until they feel safe, but they don't have to do it in order to enjoy reasonable defaults. I'm not at all saying it's an easy problem to tackle, but there is also interest in anti-abuse systems in other federated protocols such as ActivityPub. See for example this talk "Decentralized social networks vs the trolls" from the last AP Conference: https://conf.tube/videos/watch/d8c8ed69-79f0-4987-bafe-84c01f38f966 https://conf.tube/videos/watch/d8c8ed69-79f0-4987-bafe-84c01... I sure hope we can make a better situation overall, and that sacrificing privacy to reach that is not an option on the table. Privacy/pseudonymity is a fundamental pillar of anti-abuse schemes and removing it for short-term gains is sure to backfire sooner or later down the road.
NoGravitas 5y ago
XEP-0191 (Blocking command): https://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0191.html https://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0191.html It's a draft XEP, so it's not widely implemented yet. I know the server I'm using supports it via a plugin, but I don't think even Conversations supports it yet. The one thing I do think XMPP really has going on for privacy protection is that multi-user chats can be configured to not give out the real JID of members to other members, which is something I kind of miss in Matrix.
- MattJ100 5y ago
  > It's a draft XEP, so it's not widely implemented yet. Just to pick on this, sorry. The XSF terminology is not obvious (it was inherited from other standards organizations). Draft here means the protocol is absolutely in use, it just means that it is theoretically open to changes. The next stage is "Final", and that is typically only reached after substantial time in production (it's basically a statement that the document is 100% finished and won't ever be updated). There have been proposals to change the term "Draft" to "Active" or similar. XEP-0191 is supported by practically all servers: https://compliance.conversations.im/test/xep0191/ https://compliance.conversations.im/test/xep0191/ And supported by all modern clients.
- floatingatoll 5y ago
  Block commands are not the solution I'm describing, sorry. If the Block command is the network's only available abuse prevention tool, then chat network has failed to do a good enough of job of implementing anti-abuse protections. (I'm aware that some people don't believe in network-level anti-abuse protections, and I'm not going to try to convince anyone to agree with me. This is just how I evaluate whether a given chat network is accessible to me or not. XMPP is one such network, and doesn't have any, so.)
  - Zash 5y ago
    So what are you looking for?
southerntofu 5y ago
I'm sorry that's happened to you. There definitely should be ways to mitigate that. There's not a lot happening on this front to my knowledge in the Jabber/XMPP ecosystem, but there's already building blocks in place which effectively limit abuse: - Jabber addresses (JIDs) are not broadcast to everyone in public chat, only to the admins of services you use, except in private encrypted chatrooms (for encryption key retrieval) - most public chatrooms support nicknames, so you can have different nicknames in every room - it's easy with some clients to support multiple accounts to separate your activities - your address cannot be automatically gathered from 3rd party information (eg. a phone number) unless you precisely declare it in your contact information (vCard) or use a server which relies on such feature (like quicky.im to use your phone number as account name) - 3rd party information cannot be leaked from your address unless you explicitly declare it in your contact information (vCard) ; it's quite common for services based on phone numbers such as Signal to leak your phone number to third parties Unfortunately, there is nothing yet like a Web of Trust or reputation system which you could use, for example to only display friend requests from friends of friends or something like that. And there's no support for single-use aliases as we have in the email world. But there is some level of interest for that and other fields of experimentation, and there's overall strong interest in keeping users safe and happy from the community at large, and a vast majority of server operators. Many servers are operated by non-profits and much like in the Fediverse don't hesitate to defederate with a server whose admins are not interested in preventing abuse from their network. Following some issues with misogynistic neonazis in a public chatrooms a few months ago, we also setup a chatroom to discuss such issues on xmpp:abuse@joinjabber.org?join and you're more than welcome to join us and formulate ideas on how we can improve in this domain. In case you don't want to setup an account for that, you can reach the chatroom via https://anon.joinjabber.org https://anon.joinjabber.org (works on Tor browser).
- floatingatoll 5y ago
  It's okay. It started on ICQ and it's continued on every major Internet-connected social network that has ever existed. Exhaustion appears to have set in somewhat, but I'm still comforted to hear that you're studying the problem. There's certainly no support for "I don't wish to be contacted by people who are confirmed abusers" (which requires some sort of centralization and human review), because neither voting nor web of trust on their own will address the problems of sock puppets online versus real human beings, cooperative manipulation by groups of abusers, and how to select among all possible codes of conducts for one that defines and demonstrates acceptable (to me) decisions about what is abusive behavior. I appreciate the invite, but my day job takes priority, and I'm not able to allocate time for side projects this year.
megous 5y ago
Configure your client or server to reject contacts not on the whitelist?

mst 5y ago

Do you mean forced non-anomymity to the provider so every time you block them they need a new phone number to contact you again? Figuring out the right combination of G-lines to get some bastard to stay out on IRC is a bit trickier, certainly, but I'm sufficiently stubborn that even the worst of the harassers I've been chasing down for users have given up before I have.

floatingatoll 5y ago
I don't know if what you describe is the answer, but certainly I mean "someone is implementing anti-attacker processes upon new signups and existing accounts", so that the majority of abusive attacks are stopped before I'm required to Block someone. As you describe with G-lines, without a centralized anti-attacker system, it is very much the whack-a-mole game that I'm accustomed to from XMPP or IRC.
- mst 5y ago
  I sort of wish we had an effective way to say e.g. "no DMs from account that isn't <this> verified" on less centralised systems - the "no DMs from unregistered users" switch on some ircds being the most primitive possible gesture in such a direction. I imagine you'd want to turn that dial rather higher than I would, and with good reason, but having a dial at all seems like a good way to avoid a whole bunch of other potential problems. (though "if this was going to happen it probably already would have" is likely a good argument for not holding one's breath)
- southerntofu 5y ago
  > without a centralized anti-attacker system, it is very much the whack-a-mole game Unfortunately, even centralized networks play this whack-a-mole game. Facebook/Google requesting ID cards or phone number has unfortunately not eliminated abuse from their network. Which is not to say there's no way we can improve the situation (see my other comment).
  - floatingatoll 5y ago
    Your statement is incomplete, and presents only the framing "abuse was not eliminated", as if eliminating abuse were a boolean Y/N flag and therefore all steps taken to date are a total failure. The two centralized networks you referenced have eliminated some abuse from their network by taking those steps. As I said elsethread, I won't try to persuade you that it's right for them to have taken steps, but I'm certain we still both agree that it's impossible to completely eliminate abuse from any system containing user-generated content, and therefore the metric of success you set ("eliminated") is provably unattainable, which does^ invalidate your framing. ^ (unless you think it's possible to fully eliminate abuse, in which case you have a trillion dollar startup idea to pursue, because we all sure need that!)
    - southerntofu 5y ago
      > The two centralized networks you referenced have eliminated some abuse from their network by taking those steps. That is true, but at the same time they have also eliminated many legitimate users and placed remaining users in dangerous situations by requesting more personal information that can and will be leaked and will be used again them. Also, their anti-abuse model relies exclusively on the benevolence of law enforcement: that's why they collect more information in order to cooperate with law enforcement. However in most (all?) parts of the world law enforcement is neither concerned with protecting people, especially victims of cyber-harassment and misogynistic violence. Internally, Facebook and such platforms usually combat violent (as in, blood is visible) and "indecent" (a woman breastfeeding in a photo, what a scandal) content but not hateful fascist/masculinist propaganda. It usually takes a massive media scandal for such platforms to close down well-known groups coordinating harassment/doxxing campaigns. From my personal and political perspective as a politically-active non-binary person, that tradeoff is not worth it. But i can understand and respect if your perspective on the matter is different. > unless you think it's possible to fully eliminate abuse I don't think it's possible to fully eliminate abuse ever, whether in cyberspace or in the physical space. We can however, develop collective processes and reflexes in order to strongly mitigate the harm done by people attempting abuse. From a protocol's perspective, reputation systems and WoTs are not hard to specify. The real problem that has not truly been explored yet is how to develop a good UI/UX for this pattern, where the user can turn many knobs until they feel safe, but they don't have to do it in order to enjoy reasonable defaults. I'm not at all saying it's an easy problem to tackle, but there is also interest in anti-abuse systems in other federated protocols such as ActivityPub. See for example this talk "Decentralized social networks vs the trolls" from the last AP Conference: https://conf.tube/videos/watch/d8c8ed69-79f0-4987-bafe-84c01f38f966 https://conf.tube/videos/watch/d8c8ed69-79f0-4987-bafe-84c01... I sure hope we can make a better situation overall, and that sacrificing privacy to reach that is not an option on the table. Privacy/pseudonymity is a fundamental pillar of anti-abuse schemes and removing it for short-term gains is sure to backfire sooner or later down the road.

NoGravitas 5y ago

XEP-0191 (Blocking command): https://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0191.html https://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0191.html It's a draft XEP, so it's not widely implemented yet. I know the server I'm using supports it via a plugin, but I don't think even Conversations supports it yet. The one thing I do think XMPP really has going on for privacy protection is that multi-user chats can be configured to not give out the real JID of members to other members, which is something I kind of miss in Matrix.

MattJ100 5y ago
> It's a draft XEP, so it's not widely implemented yet. Just to pick on this, sorry. The XSF terminology is not obvious (it was inherited from other standards organizations). Draft here means the protocol is absolutely in use, it just means that it is theoretically open to changes. The next stage is "Final", and that is typically only reached after substantial time in production (it's basically a statement that the document is 100% finished and won't ever be updated). There have been proposals to change the term "Draft" to "Active" or similar. XEP-0191 is supported by practically all servers: https://compliance.conversations.im/test/xep0191/ https://compliance.conversations.im/test/xep0191/ And supported by all modern clients.
floatingatoll 5y ago
Block commands are not the solution I'm describing, sorry. If the Block command is the network's only available abuse prevention tool, then chat network has failed to do a good enough of job of implementing anti-abuse protections. (I'm aware that some people don't believe in network-level anti-abuse protections, and I'm not going to try to convince anyone to agree with me. This is just how I evaluate whether a given chat network is accessible to me or not. XMPP is one such network, and doesn't have any, so.)
- Zash 5y ago
  So what are you looking for?

southerntofu 5y ago

I'm sorry that's happened to you. There definitely should be ways to mitigate that. There's not a lot happening on this front to my knowledge in the Jabber/XMPP ecosystem, but there's already building blocks in place which effectively limit abuse: - Jabber addresses (JIDs) are not broadcast to everyone in public chat, only to the admins of services you use, except in private encrypted chatrooms (for encryption key retrieval) - most public chatrooms support nicknames, so you can have different nicknames in every room - it's easy with some clients to support multiple accounts to separate your activities - your address cannot be automatically gathered from 3rd party information (eg. a phone number) unless you precisely declare it in your contact information (vCard) or use a server which relies on such feature (like quicky.im to use your phone number as account name) - 3rd party information cannot be leaked from your address unless you explicitly declare it in your contact information (vCard) ; it's quite common for services based on phone numbers such as Signal to leak your phone number to third parties Unfortunately, there is nothing yet like a Web of Trust or reputation system which you could use, for example to only display friend requests from friends of friends or something like that. And there's no support for single-use aliases as we have in the email world. But there is some level of interest for that and other fields of experimentation, and there's overall strong interest in keeping users safe and happy from the community at large, and a vast majority of server operators. Many servers are operated by non-profits and much like in the Fediverse don't hesitate to defederate with a server whose admins are not interested in preventing abuse from their network. Following some issues with misogynistic neonazis in a public chatrooms a few months ago, we also setup a chatroom to discuss such issues on xmpp:abuse@joinjabber.org?join and you're more than welcome to join us and formulate ideas on how we can improve in this domain. In case you don't want to setup an account for that, you can reach the chatroom via https://anon.joinjabber.org https://anon.joinjabber.org (works on Tor browser).

floatingatoll 5y ago
It's okay. It started on ICQ and it's continued on every major Internet-connected social network that has ever existed. Exhaustion appears to have set in somewhat, but I'm still comforted to hear that you're studying the problem. There's certainly no support for "I don't wish to be contacted by people who are confirmed abusers" (which requires some sort of centralization and human review), because neither voting nor web of trust on their own will address the problems of sock puppets online versus real human beings, cooperative manipulation by groups of abusers, and how to select among all possible codes of conducts for one that defines and demonstrates acceptable (to me) decisions about what is abusive behavior. I appreciate the invite, but my day job takes priority, and I'm not able to allocate time for side projects this year.

megous 5y ago

Configure your client or server to reject contacts not on the whitelist?