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What are some knock-on effects of having a predominance of sigint and not much humint?

dredmorbius 5y ago
In an instance I'm vaguely familiar with, early in the War on Terrorism, US intelligence agencies, which rely very heavily on signals-based intelligence, especially the ability to intercept cables (including encrypted ones, thanks to a backdoor in Crypt AG's devices), telephone and satellite communications, radio/broadcast, and digital / computer communications ... were apparently stymied in trying to gather intelligence on Al Qaeda as that adversary avoided use of modern communications, relying strongly on personal messengers and physical media. Humint capabilities of penetrating cells or converting individuals were said to be underdeveloped. Effectively, the NSA had excellent vision where Al Qaeda did not exist, and was blind where they did. The quantity and low cost of sigint can often lead to a deprecation of humint. It's not sexy, it's slow, it's low-volume, it's expensive, it doesn't generate large support contracts with government suppliers. But it can put precisely the right eyes and ears in precisely the right place in ways sigint often has difficulty in achieving. Mind: this is based on open-sources discussion at the time. How much this reflected actuality vs. speculation or public campaigning / turf wars between intelligence camps (CIA tends to be more humint, NSA more sigint AFAIU) I'm not sure. This is a much more recent article (I'm referring mostly to the 2000--2005 period), but makes similar points: https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/enhanced-human-intelligence-is-key-to-defeating-terrorists/ https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/enhanced-human-...
- edmundsauto 5y ago
  Otoh, wasn’t trusting human intel the reason the US claimed Iraq had WMD? (There are pitfalls to human intel too)
  - dredmorbius 5y ago
    My understanding is that it was more a case of what the US administration wanted to hear and believe. The actual on-the-ground investigation was done by an at least nominally-independent UN team (UNSCOM). Scott Ritter specifically rejected WMD claims: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scott_Ritter https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scott_Ritter The investigation lead by Hans Blix found some violations but AFAIR no indications of a significant WMD capability. The Wikipedia article has more information (I've skimmed it): https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_and_weapons_of_mass_des... I don't think this maps well to the Humint/Sigint division. Inspectors relied somewhat on both, though non-covert on-site visits played a large role. (Sigint and Humint are more typically covert.)

In an instance I'm vaguely familiar with, early in the War on Terrorism, US intelligence agencies, which rely very heavily on signals-based intelligence, especially the ability to intercept cables (including encrypted ones, thanks to a backdoor in Crypt AG's devices), telephone and satellite communications, radio/broadcast, and digital / computer communications ... were apparently stymied in trying to gather intelligence on Al Qaeda as that adversary avoided use of modern communications, relying strongly on personal messengers and physical media. Humint capabilities of penetrating cells or converting individuals were said to be underdeveloped. Effectively, the NSA had excellent vision where Al Qaeda did not exist, and was blind where they did. The quantity and low cost of sigint can often lead to a deprecation of humint. It's not sexy, it's slow, it's low-volume, it's expensive, it doesn't generate large support contracts with government suppliers. But it can put precisely the right eyes and ears in precisely the right place in ways sigint often has difficulty in achieving. Mind: this is based on open-sources discussion at the time. How much this reflected actuality vs. speculation or public campaigning / turf wars between intelligence camps (CIA tends to be more humint, NSA more sigint AFAIU) I'm not sure. This is a much more recent article (I'm referring mostly to the 2000--2005 period), but makes similar points: https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/enhanced-human-intelligence-is-key-to-defeating-terrorists/ https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/enhanced-human-...

edmundsauto 5y ago
Otoh, wasn’t trusting human intel the reason the US claimed Iraq had WMD? (There are pitfalls to human intel too)
- dredmorbius 5y ago
  My understanding is that it was more a case of what the US administration wanted to hear and believe. The actual on-the-ground investigation was done by an at least nominally-independent UN team (UNSCOM). Scott Ritter specifically rejected WMD claims: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scott_Ritter https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scott_Ritter The investigation lead by Hans Blix found some violations but AFAIR no indications of a significant WMD capability. The Wikipedia article has more information (I've skimmed it): https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_and_weapons_of_mass_des... I don't think this maps well to the Humint/Sigint division. Inspectors relied somewhat on both, though non-covert on-site visits played a large role. (Sigint and Humint are more typically covert.)