> Requiring a second key to unlock a lock does not invalidate the fact that the first key can be picked (which the question was about). Apple’s CSAM mechanism

> Requiring a second key to unlock a lock does not invalidate the fact that the first key can be picked (which the question was about). Apple’s CSAM mechanism can’t be ‘picked’ in the way that you claim. The two ‘locks’ are not separate. You can’t pick them one at a time. > I had read through the technical whitepaper [1], which does not include this information. Thank you for sharing. Since the second hash only works on pictures that Apple can decrypt within this system ("for an account that exceeded the match threshold"), this merely saves the human reviewers at Apple time. This is false. The second hash is independent and designed to prevent attacks based on adversarial spoofing of neuralhash. Nobody, not even Apple, denies that someone can generate neuralhash collisions. You can only assert that this is a vulnerability by making the false claim that a neuralhash collision alone will cause the system to flag an image.