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This has potential consequences I don't like. Once negative results are incentivized the same way as positive results, cheaters could have a perverse incentive

by tux3 5y ago

This has potential consequences I don't like. Once negative results are incentivized the same way as positive results, cheaters could have a perverse incentive to post fraudulent failures to replicate, too. I think I agree that we need much more transparency and scientific rigor, first. Post the data whenever possible, incentivize people for creating good study protocols that make it harder for any single person to fake the data without it being obvious. Once we have enough confidence in that, let's do preregistration, sure. And then negative results should be as incentivized as positive ones, absolutely. I worry about the order in which we want to do these things. If people are faking data, we need to make this specific step harder to hide from reviewers. If you incentivize people to fail to replicate each other without solving the lag between fraudulent data and retractation, you will get fraudulent negative results. That could cause a lot of confusion. If the replication crisis itself starts to be fraudulent, scientific credibility is further damaged, negative results will be less credible, and fraudsters will profit from the confusion.

regardsop 5y ago
"If negative results are published like other information, people could have a incentive to replicate post fraudulent failures"? Um sounds worse, (OT:) to add something a simpified (strict stripped) example -hope practicable: You work at a company. Orders are comming in, wares are placed as 'reserved' till paid, than shipped. With a worker perspective, you check the emails with orders ('the customer whishes'), sending 'bills' and the wares if, or if not been paid - 'you've been paid'. Viewed by the company-manager your position may a) be valid oder come b) 'overvalued' (...) Stucked in this example, you talked to other 'employeees' during break and 'there was a time meeting on weekends', so you talked about work and there was a (special) kind of 'more transparency' than without peer review. ^^ Regards, hope this helps... (-:
- tux3 5y ago
  I'm not sure I understand your point, but if you're saying that posting negative results is good, then yes, I agree! I'm only trying to make a point about the order in which we should shift incentives vs increase fraud-resistance requirements for experimental protocols. I think the latter is more important, and should be done first.

by tux3 5y ago

regardsop 5y ago

"If negative results are published like other information, people could have a incentive to replicate post fraudulent failures"? Um sounds worse, (OT:) to add something a simpified (strict stripped) example -hope practicable: You work at a company. Orders are comming in, wares are placed as 'reserved' till paid, than shipped. With a worker perspective, you check the emails with orders ('the customer whishes'), sending 'bills' and the wares if, or if not been paid - 'you've been paid'. Viewed by the company-manager your position may a) be valid oder come b) 'overvalued' (...) Stucked in this example, you talked to other 'employeees' during break and 'there was a time meeting on weekends', so you talked about work and there was a (special) kind of 'more transparency' than without peer review. ^^ Regards, hope this helps... (-:

tux3 5y ago
I'm not sure I understand your point, but if you're saying that posting negative results is good, then yes, I agree! I'm only trying to make a point about the order in which we should shift incentives vs increase fraud-resistance requirements for experimental protocols. I think the latter is more important, and should be done first.