4 ms·
Digital thieves aren't that organized, and mainly seem to be trying to defraud banks. When thieves do their thing, the narrative is automatically biased against
by mindslight 5y ago
Digital thieves aren't that organized, and mainly seem to be trying to defraud banks. When thieves do their thing, the narrative is automatically biased against them - nobody spins their activities as justifiable, and there are many government agencies that work to track them down and stop them.
Meanwhile commercial surveillance also consists of explicitly malicious parties. LexisNexis isn't storing your data to benefit you. But when Surveillance Valley does its thing, their activities aren't even illegal. And it takes many years for the media narrative to even acknowledge the harm.
So no, I'm not terribly worried about information thieves. Most news stories that focus on them seem like simplistic distractions to focus people on the wrong threat.
- mdp2021 5y agoNo, there is a misunderstanding here: not /information/ thieves. I meant, people using data of yours extracted from some less protected repository to facilitate financial theft against you and similar. Credit card details are an example, but also any data facilitating impersonation. Base dangers, vs more complex dangers.
- mindslight 5y agoYou're going to need to give some concrete examples to detail the specific threat you're imagining. I was already addressing the possibility of someone impersonating me to defraud financial institutions. This would be annoying, but is straightforwardly handled by our existing institutions. In the absolute worst case I would have to retain an attorney to protect against levying of my actual bank accounts, etc, while the defrauded parties sort themselves out. Do you have a different threat in mind?
- mdp2021 5y agoI (with the rest of the interested) will try to think more detailed examples, but I can already note that you seem to have much more faith than I have in your protection from the insurance, from the service providers and from the system. I am very concerned with security holes opened by legislation such as the PSD2 in Europe - they should not exist in the first place, I want to sleep well in the notion that the project is solid -, and banks far from necessarily assume that you are the victim: very uncomfortable demands of proof may exist (up to, in a slightly different context, frequently heard absurdities such as "prove that your handheld was secure" [it is not, the service provider is the one that should provide security, not the user!!] or "prove that you did not write your PIN number somewhere in the stolen wallet containing your ATM card" [and then prove what, that one does not think of Spencer Tracy!?]). But the matter is not (for clarity) just with the example of theft. That personal data is collected inappropriately is not just a reason for moral outrage, there may be also basic real consequences. Your personal messages, under "bad" practices, for example, may leak to more repositories: if one of them is compromised, your privacy may be exposed in ways difficult to compensate. These should not be forgotten, while keeping in mind other, very practical but not immediate for some, situations like "Ah, Mr. Jones, so we came to know you are a dissident", and the general disconcert. And by the way, when I was re-reading the imperfect 'disconcert', the term 'discomfort' came to mind. Which makes other situations come to mind. In Europe some legislation mandates to have microphones (plus GPS and radio) in the new batches of cars (post 2018, to be used in case of car crash): some may never want to enter any such trap. If I felt uncomfortable with having my phone on I would just remove the battery, but not feeling comfortable even when one is in one's own car, that is way, way, way, way_times_by_1000 too much. Back to the article, it may not take much to have an entity decide, "let us record it". And then, for some reason (subcontractors, public-private partnerships etc.), have copies around. And then, owing to holes, having one's privacy exposed... Which brings me back to my original point: what if not just the big-s-state or its contractors, or partners (already here we are at mind-boggling reality from a moral and good-sensical point of view), could access those intrusion devices, but just Mr. Random, owing to security holes? I do not forget that my privacy is also against Mr. Random, together with Society, Enterprise and State.