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Lie? I don't take kindly to such words, because you're ascribing malicious intent where there is none. Please check your tone... HN comments are about assuming
by azinman2 5y ago
Lie? I don't take kindly to such words, because you're ascribing malicious intent where there is none. Please check your tone... HN comments are about assuming the best in everyone.
This is only applying to photos uploaded to iCloud. Every single thing talks exactly about that, including the technical details: https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/CSAM_Detection_Technical_Summary.pdf https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/CSAM_Detection_Techni...
The hash matching is occurring on device, but only for iCloud photo images:
> Before an image is stored in iCloud Photos, an on-device matching process is performed for that image against the database of known CSAM hashes. This matching process is powered by a cryptographic technology called private set intersection, which determines whether there is a match without revealing the result. The device creates a cryptographic safety voucher that encodes the match result. It also encrypts the image’s NeuralHash and a visual derivative. This voucher is uploaded to iCloud Photos along with the image.
Read that PDF. You'll see everything in it is designed for iCloud photos only.
- sennight 5y ago> Lie? I don't take kindly to such words, because you're ascribing malicious intent where there is none. Howdy partner, it seems my tone communicated the sentiment as intended. It is unreasonable to ascribe anything but malice in this case, because the rationale strains credulity. Do you know at what point Apple is determining your intent to sync photos? What processes, exactly, are they hooking into in order to trigger the local hash functionality? Is it the resource hogging Photos-Agent frequently complained about? Is this thresholding functionality restricted to cloud content, or is the local database mentioned involved? Does that local database only relate to images uploaded to the cloud, and how would the deletion of local and/or cloud content influence that? These are all questions that are either unaddressed, provide no assurance beyond "trust us", or hint at logical conflicts between the stated purpose of local scanning and the actual implementation details. With all that in mind, granting Apple and its defenders the benefit of doubt is laughably foolish.