4 ms·

The passcode limit constant is enforced by the secure enclave. I don't know if it's been proven that the secure enclave component of the device can be changed w

The passcode limit constant is enforced by the secure enclave. I don't know if it's been proven that the secure enclave component of the device can be changed without the device being unlocked. I'm not even sure it possible for any operating system updates to occur on a device which is locked.

shuckles 5y ago
Not on the iPhone 5C which was the phone used by the terrorist and did not have an SE. Locked iPhones can be updated from DFU, but I think SE firmware can’t.
snowwrestler 5y ago
The technical feasibility of the FBI’s request was never the question, nor the basis of Apple’s objection. Of course it’s even easier for Apple to say “no” to the government if they literally cannot do what the government is asking. That’s the basis of the EFF’s objection to Apple’s plans: they think that by implementing this CSAM system, Apple will turn an impossibility into a possibility.
- shuckles 5y ago
  We were never in a world where Apple was unable to do what the government was asking. Nothing impossible has been made possible, and Apple has made a stand against small changes - like changing constants - before.
  - HWR_14 5y ago
    It's not "impossibility". It's cost. The FBI cannot force Apple to do free work to circumvent security. Can they force them to add one more hash? Is that work?
    - shuckles 5y ago
      I’m not a lawyer, but at the very least Apple would have to train its reviewers to recognize new image types, redact or update all statements where they explicitly drew a line in the sand about what the feature searched for, likely produce a custom build of iOS, update its knowledge base to distinguish between the root hash of the CSAM database and FBI Imagery database, perhaps re-present consent, add code to target this new database (or subset of the full database) to US users, etc. I’m not a product manager either, but superficially simple changes are often quite complex!
      - HWR_14 5y ago
        I think once Apple has established a pipeline for adding content in a known pattern and at a known cost, it lowers the legal bar (although I am not a lawyer). The government can take your stuff, they just have to pay you for it. I'm not sure if adding the N+1 image to the next dataset is similar to that or not.
    - simondotau 5y ago
      > Can [the FBI] force them to add one more hash? No. Because the hash causes searches to be performed on citizens' private property, this would be an unambiguous, indisputable, clear-cut violation of the 4th Amendment.
      - brokenmachine 5y ago
        What if they ask nicely?

shuckles 5y ago

Not on the iPhone 5C which was the phone used by the terrorist and did not have an SE. Locked iPhones can be updated from DFU, but I think SE firmware can’t.

snowwrestler 5y ago

The technical feasibility of the FBI’s request was never the question, nor the basis of Apple’s objection. Of course it’s even easier for Apple to say “no” to the government if they literally cannot do what the government is asking. That’s the basis of the EFF’s objection to Apple’s plans: they think that by implementing this CSAM system, Apple will turn an impossibility into a possibility.

shuckles 5y ago
We were never in a world where Apple was unable to do what the government was asking. Nothing impossible has been made possible, and Apple has made a stand against small changes - like changing constants - before.
- HWR_14 5y ago
  It's not "impossibility". It's cost. The FBI cannot force Apple to do free work to circumvent security. Can they force them to add one more hash? Is that work?
  - shuckles 5y ago
    I’m not a lawyer, but at the very least Apple would have to train its reviewers to recognize new image types, redact or update all statements where they explicitly drew a line in the sand about what the feature searched for, likely produce a custom build of iOS, update its knowledge base to distinguish between the root hash of the CSAM database and FBI Imagery database, perhaps re-present consent, add code to target this new database (or subset of the full database) to US users, etc. I’m not a product manager either, but superficially simple changes are often quite complex!
    - HWR_14 5y ago
      I think once Apple has established a pipeline for adding content in a known pattern and at a known cost, it lowers the legal bar (although I am not a lawyer). The government can take your stuff, they just have to pay you for it. I'm not sure if adding the N+1 image to the next dataset is similar to that or not.
  - simondotau 5y ago
    > Can [the FBI] force them to add one more hash? No. Because the hash causes searches to be performed on citizens' private property, this would be an unambiguous, indisputable, clear-cut violation of the 4th Amendment.
    - brokenmachine 5y ago
      What if they ask nicely?