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But the FBI can’t just add the hashes to the db. That’s why it’s the intersection of two dbs in two jurisdictions… to prevent exactly that kind of attack. Then
by azinman2 5y ago
But the FBI can’t just add the hashes to the db. That’s why it’s the intersection of two dbs in two jurisdictions… to prevent exactly that kind of attack. Then they need to pass a human reviewer as well.
- xkcd-sucks 5y agoFive Eyes
- simondotau 5y agoYou are suggesting that another country could launder the request on behalf of the USA in order to circumvent the 4th Amendment. Okay then, let's play that out. Australia contacts Apple and demands they augment CSAM detection so that every iPhone in the USA is now scanning for image hashes supplied by Australia. Apple says no. End of hypothetical.
- salawat 5y agoYou haven't heard of how GCHQ would happily hand over intelligence they had on U.S. Citizens? I know for a fact there are efforts at creating fusion centers across national boundaries. The question you need to ask is not if but what will make you interesting enough to mobilize against. Thou shalt not build the effing Panopticon, nor it's predecessors. Is that so hard to not do.
- simondotau 5y agoI've no doubt that GCHQ would hand whatever they like to whomever they like. But why would Apple comply with a demand from the GCHQ to spy on US citizens?
- brokenmachine 5y agoThey will come up with some kind of fuckery to get around the rules, like some crypto ridiculousness that makes files that match a certain hash go to servers in a different jurisdiction? Far-fetched, I know...
- nonlocutor 5y agohttps://www.lawfareblog.com/legal-tetris-and-fbis-anom-program https://www.lawfareblog.com/legal-tetris-and-fbis-anom-progr... “ The Australian Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Act 2018 (TOLA) allows government agencies to issue “technical assistance” and “technical capability” notices to providers of communications services. The notices require that the providers give the authorities help in conducting criminal enforcement intercepts, and that they make changes in their systems to ensure that they can give that help.” … “In any event, the FBI chose a curiously roundabout way of getting access to ANOM messages. For ANOM devices operating outside of the United States, “an encrypted [blind carbon copy or BCC]” of each message that a user sent was transmitted to a server located outside of the United States, which then decrypted and reencrypted the message with an encryption key known to the FBI. Those reencrypted messages were sent to another server that was owned by the FBI, outside of the United States. In the summer of 2019, the FBI started negotiating to build the legal structure that would make this technical architecture work. In essence, the FBI went looking for a third country that would host the BCC server and could lawfully accept all of the decrypted messages and send the copies to the FBI. As the affidavit notes, “Unlike the Australian beta test, the third country would not review the content in the first instance.” This would have been a fascinating negotiation. Both participants wanted to make criminal cases and avoid privacy scandals. The U.S. would want to be sure that the third country had full legal authority to intercept the contents of every ANOM message, and that the country was also willing to share the full ANOM take with the U.S. in something like real time.”
- simondotau 5y agoNone of that explains how Australia could ever successfully coerce Apple into performing widespread surveillance of US citizens. The fact that Australia is a "five eyes" country doesn't make it any more plausible than if the demand came from China or Russia.
- vermilingua 5y agoIt explains how Australia could coerce Apple into performing widespread surveillance of Aus citizens. Then it’s trivial for the US to coerce Apple into switching that functionality on in the US.
- azinman2 5y agoIt hasn't been announced yet who else's db will be used. If it's not a 'five eyes' member... then what?