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> ...if you have CP or photos in a CP database... Which database? I get the impression that people think there is a singular repository for thoroughly vetted a

> ...if you have CP or photos in a CP database... Which database? I get the impression that people think there is a singular repository for thoroughly vetted and highly controlled CP evidence submission. No such thing exists.

azinman2 5y ago
It’s an intersection between a US db and a not yet chosen non-US db, which then will have a human reviewer verify its CP before sending off to the authorities.
- sennight 5y ago
  > What more could one ask for? An independent audit for both the secret secondary perceptual hashing algorithm and the chain of custody policies/compliance for the "US db" and the disconcertedly open ended "not yet chosen non-US db"?
  - azinman2 5y ago
    Do you ask for the same audit at Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Dropbox, and countless others who are already doing this and have been for years? I do not share your same concern of some abused db _today_.
    - amadeuspagel 5y ago
      Neither Google nor Microsoft scan pictures people have on their devices running Android or Windows. I'm not sure how that's even applicable to Facebook and Dropbox.
      - azinman2 5y ago
        You’re asking for an auditing chain presumably due to concerns about governments putting in photos of things that aren’t CP. Apple is only doing this for photos that get uploaded to iCloud, with this neural hash that gets uploaded with it. The actual verification of a CP match occurs on the server due to the hashes being blinded. So in many ways, it’s very similar to what these other cloud providers effectively do — search for CP matches on uploaded data. If you’re concerned about non-CP being scanned for, then you should already be concerned about that with everyone else. Thus if you’re asking for auditing of Apple, then you should widen your request. If you do, then sure, I can understand that. If you’re not concerned about the existing system, then I think you’re being non-consistent. Most people in comments to me seem to be non-consistent, and are being overly knee jerk about this… myself included initially.
      - dwaite 5y ago
        Microsoft, Google, Facebook, Dropbox, etc. all scan photos which are cloud hosted for CSAM. Apple's new system scans only photos which are cloud hosted for CSAM. This would be the source of the inconsistency - that the code to do scanning is on the client side of the uploader rather than the server side of the uploader does not change any abuse scenarios, but exclusively serves "slippery slope" arguments of full on-device surveillance.
        noptd 5y ago
        >does not change any abuse scenarios It absolutely does. When the scanning is server-side, companies can only scan the files you choose to send to their servers but with a client-side system in place, all it takes is a change in company policy and a few simple directory config changes to result in ANY file on your device being scanned. Slippery slope or not, the client-side system massively lowers the bar for abuse and that cannot be ignored.
        azinman2 5y ago
        Except it's only occurring while simultaneously uploading to iCloud. The hash is metadata that goes along with it.
    - feanaro 5y ago
      We should definitely start. Also, do those companies implement such subversive technology in devices they sell you?
    - sennight 5y ago
      Sure, but I don't expect it from third party cloud platforms - in the same way I wouldn't expect accountability from a garbage man who reports to the police after finding evidence of crime in my garbage. Apple is, for some insane reason, trying to establish the precedent that the contents of your Apple product are now part of the public space - where expectation of privacy isn't a thing.
      - azinman2 5y ago
        But that isn’t true. This is only photos uploaded to iCloud.
        sennight 5y ago
        Why would you lie about something so easily disproven? "Instead of scanning images in the cloud, the system performs on-device matching..." https://www.apple.com/child-safety/ https://www.apple.com/child-safety/
        azinman2 5y ago
        Lie? I don't take kindly to such words, because you're ascribing malicious intent where there is none. Please check your tone... HN comments are about assuming the best in everyone. This is only applying to photos uploaded to iCloud. Every single thing talks exactly about that, including the technical details: https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/CSAM_Detection_Technical_Summary.pdf https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/CSAM_Detection_Techni... The hash matching is occurring on device, but only for iCloud photo images: > Before an image is stored in iCloud Photos, an on-device matching process is performed for that image against the database of known CSAM hashes. This matching process is powered by a cryptographic technology called private set intersection, which determines whether there is a match without revealing the result. The device creates a cryptographic safety voucher that encodes the match result. It also encrypts the image’s NeuralHash and a visual derivative. This voucher is uploaded to iCloud Photos along with the image. Read that PDF. You'll see everything in it is designed for iCloud photos only.
    - istingray 5y ago
      I don't use those services for this reason. Apple was the last remaining option that didn't do surveillance.
  - Grustaf 5y ago
    What's the point of that? If you don't trust Apple, why would you use Photos.app in the first place? They already have 100% control over that, and can spy as much as they want to. No need to go by way of the CSAM database, that would be absurd.
    - sennight 5y ago
      I've never been a customer of Apple but I'll try and imagine the experience... I might trust them to assemble hardware and write software for my consumer needs - but that doesn't mean I trust them to competently reason about me potentially being a pedo. That is only a small part of a much larger point, but it is reason enough alone.
      - dwaite 5y ago
        Apple's responsibility ends with notifying law enforcement, at which point presumably there would be a subpoena for evidence and a trial. The concern people have is logic on their phone snitching on them, with scenarios based on authoritative regimes setting the baseline of what is scanned/reported. Apple is not serving as judge, jury and executioner (unless there is an electric shock delivery system being added to the iPhone 13)
        sennight 5y ago
        That could be the most obnoxious nitpick I've ever heard, do you honestly think anybody is worried about Apple doing anything beyond submitting a false report - and that you are being helpful by pointing out that they can only do that very thing? Do you think that might be why I said "competently reason about" instead of "send the Apple genius death squad"?
      - Grustaf 5y ago
        My point is that people seem to think that this feature somehow makes it easier for Apple to spy on you. In fact it doesn’t make any difference at all, since they already have full access to everything you do on the phone, so if you don’t trust them you shouldn’t use an iphone.
- mkl 5y ago
  > which then will have a human reviewer verify its CP No, it won't. The human reviewer only sees very low resolution thumbnails, to check there's a "match". The content is not verified, so the two DBs could contain anything.

azinman2 5y ago

It’s an intersection between a US db and a not yet chosen non-US db, which then will have a human reviewer verify its CP before sending off to the authorities.

sennight 5y ago
> What more could one ask for? An independent audit for both the secret secondary perceptual hashing algorithm and the chain of custody policies/compliance for the "US db" and the disconcertedly open ended "not yet chosen non-US db"?
- azinman2 5y ago
  Do you ask for the same audit at Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Dropbox, and countless others who are already doing this and have been for years? I do not share your same concern of some abused db _today_.
  - amadeuspagel 5y ago
    Neither Google nor Microsoft scan pictures people have on their devices running Android or Windows. I'm not sure how that's even applicable to Facebook and Dropbox.
    - azinman2 5y ago
      You’re asking for an auditing chain presumably due to concerns about governments putting in photos of things that aren’t CP. Apple is only doing this for photos that get uploaded to iCloud, with this neural hash that gets uploaded with it. The actual verification of a CP match occurs on the server due to the hashes being blinded. So in many ways, it’s very similar to what these other cloud providers effectively do — search for CP matches on uploaded data. If you’re concerned about non-CP being scanned for, then you should already be concerned about that with everyone else. Thus if you’re asking for auditing of Apple, then you should widen your request. If you do, then sure, I can understand that. If you’re not concerned about the existing system, then I think you’re being non-consistent. Most people in comments to me seem to be non-consistent, and are being overly knee jerk about this… myself included initially.
    - dwaite 5y ago
      Microsoft, Google, Facebook, Dropbox, etc. all scan photos which are cloud hosted for CSAM. Apple's new system scans only photos which are cloud hosted for CSAM. This would be the source of the inconsistency - that the code to do scanning is on the client side of the uploader rather than the server side of the uploader does not change any abuse scenarios, but exclusively serves "slippery slope" arguments of full on-device surveillance.
      - noptd 5y ago
        >does not change any abuse scenarios It absolutely does. When the scanning is server-side, companies can only scan the files you choose to send to their servers but with a client-side system in place, all it takes is a change in company policy and a few simple directory config changes to result in ANY file on your device being scanned. Slippery slope or not, the client-side system massively lowers the bar for abuse and that cannot be ignored.
        azinman2 5y ago
        Except it's only occurring while simultaneously uploading to iCloud. The hash is metadata that goes along with it.
  - feanaro 5y ago
    We should definitely start. Also, do those companies implement such subversive technology in devices they sell you?
  - sennight 5y ago
    Sure, but I don't expect it from third party cloud platforms - in the same way I wouldn't expect accountability from a garbage man who reports to the police after finding evidence of crime in my garbage. Apple is, for some insane reason, trying to establish the precedent that the contents of your Apple product are now part of the public space - where expectation of privacy isn't a thing.
    - azinman2 5y ago
      But that isn’t true. This is only photos uploaded to iCloud.
      - sennight 5y ago
        Why would you lie about something so easily disproven? "Instead of scanning images in the cloud, the system performs on-device matching..." https://www.apple.com/child-safety/ https://www.apple.com/child-safety/
        azinman2 5y ago
        Lie? I don't take kindly to such words, because you're ascribing malicious intent where there is none. Please check your tone... HN comments are about assuming the best in everyone. This is only applying to photos uploaded to iCloud. Every single thing talks exactly about that, including the technical details: https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/CSAM_Detection_Technical_Summary.pdf https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/CSAM_Detection_Techni... The hash matching is occurring on device, but only for iCloud photo images: > Before an image is stored in iCloud Photos, an on-device matching process is performed for that image against the database of known CSAM hashes. This matching process is powered by a cryptographic technology called private set intersection, which determines whether there is a match without revealing the result. The device creates a cryptographic safety voucher that encodes the match result. It also encrypts the image’s NeuralHash and a visual derivative. This voucher is uploaded to iCloud Photos along with the image. Read that PDF. You'll see everything in it is designed for iCloud photos only.
  - istingray 5y ago
    I don't use those services for this reason. Apple was the last remaining option that didn't do surveillance.
- Grustaf 5y ago
  What's the point of that? If you don't trust Apple, why would you use Photos.app in the first place? They already have 100% control over that, and can spy as much as they want to. No need to go by way of the CSAM database, that would be absurd.
  - sennight 5y ago
    I've never been a customer of Apple but I'll try and imagine the experience... I might trust them to assemble hardware and write software for my consumer needs - but that doesn't mean I trust them to competently reason about me potentially being a pedo. That is only a small part of a much larger point, but it is reason enough alone.
    - dwaite 5y ago
      Apple's responsibility ends with notifying law enforcement, at which point presumably there would be a subpoena for evidence and a trial. The concern people have is logic on their phone snitching on them, with scenarios based on authoritative regimes setting the baseline of what is scanned/reported. Apple is not serving as judge, jury and executioner (unless there is an electric shock delivery system being added to the iPhone 13)
      - sennight 5y ago
        That could be the most obnoxious nitpick I've ever heard, do you honestly think anybody is worried about Apple doing anything beyond submitting a false report - and that you are being helpful by pointing out that they can only do that very thing? Do you think that might be why I said "competently reason about" instead of "send the Apple genius death squad"?
    - Grustaf 5y ago
      My point is that people seem to think that this feature somehow makes it easier for Apple to spy on you. In fact it doesn’t make any difference at all, since they already have full access to everything you do on the phone, so if you don’t trust them you shouldn’t use an iphone.
mkl 5y ago
> which then will have a human reviewer verify its CP No, it won't. The human reviewer only sees very low resolution thumbnails, to check there's a "match". The content is not verified, so the two DBs could contain anything.